


JPRS-TAC-90-016
30 MAY 1990



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Arms Control

19980203 240

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

**DHC QUALITY INSPECTED &
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**

**Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited**

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-90-016

CONTENTS

30 May 1990

CHINA

Article Views Changes in Warsaw Pact [SHIJIE ZHISHI No 8, 16 Apr]	1
Changing U.S. Defense Strategy Discussed [RENMIN RIBAO 11 May]	3
U.S. Arms Control Tactics Viewed [H. Yumin; BEIJING REVIEW No 20, 14-20 May]	4
Japan's Kaifu Urges Soviet Arms Cuts in Region [XINHUA 21 May]	8
Delegate Speaks at UN Parliamentary Disarmament Conference [XINHUA 22 May]	8

EAST ASIA

JAPAN

Nakayama Says Soviet Military Threat Receding [KYODO 11 May]	9
Kaifu Calls for Soviet Arms Cut in Far East [KYODO 21 May]	9

MONGOLIA

Second Stage of Soviet Troop Withdrawal Begins [MONTSAME 15 May]	9
--	---

THAILAND

General Comments on Arms Procurement Policy [DAILY NEWS 26 Feb]	10
---	----

EAST EUROPE

INTERBLOC AFFAIRS

Budapest Phase of 'Open Skies' Conference Ends [MTI 10 May]	11
---	----

BULGARIA

General Dobrev on Warsaw Pact Anniversary [K. Dobrev; NARODNA ARMIYA 15 May]	11
--	----

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Bush's Lance Decision Viewed Favorably [MLADA FRONTA 5 May]	13
Vacek Calls for 'Leaner' Army [M. Vacek; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 May]	13
Report on Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Bohemia [Prague Radio 10 May]	15
Soviet Troops To Leave Sliac 5 Oct [Prague Radio 11 May]	15
Vacek on Positive, Negative Aspects of Warsaw Pact [CTK 13 May]	15
Poll Reveals Public's Views on Warsaw Pact, EC [LIDOVE NOVINY 14 May]	16
CSFR Prepares for Convention on Chemical Arms [CTK 21 May]	16

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Replacement of Lance Missiles in FRG Criticized [G. Prokot; NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 5-6 May]	16
Defense Minister Eppelmann on Soviet Talks [R. Eppelmann; East Berlin Radio 10 May]	16
Eppelmann: June Pact Meeting Agenda Expanded [ADN 10 May]	18
Wieczorek on Desire To Disengage From Pact [ADN 11 May]	18
Eppelmann Says Warsaw Pact 'Breaking Up' [ADN 14 May]	18

HUNGARY

Ambassador Meiszter on Vienna Disarmament Talks [D. Meiszter; NEPSZABADSAG 5 May]	19
Deputy Vasarhelyi Proposes Quitting Warsaw Pact	19
National Assembly Speech [M. Vasarhelyi; Budapest Radio 9 May]	19
Further on Warsaw Pact Issue [Szorenyi; Budapest Radio 9 May]	20
Horn Uncertain About Proposed Pact Withdrawal [Budapest Radio 9 May]	20
Defense Spokesman on USSR Troop Withdrawals [G. Keleti; Budapest Radio 9 May]	21
Hungary's Warsaw Pact Membership Analyzed [P. Vajda; NEPSZABADSAG 10 May]	21
Defense Ministry Report on Soviet Withdrawals [MTI 11 May]	22
MDF's Jeszensky on Warsaw Pact, Germany [Budapest Radio 12 May]	22
SZDSZ Official on Pact Withdrawal Proposal [I. Mecs; NEPSZABADSAG 14 May]	23
More on Withdrawal of Soviet Air Regiment [MTI 18 May]	24
Foreign Affairs Committee Discusses Pact Withdrawal [P. Zentai; Budapest Radio 29 May]	24

POLAND

Soviet Troop Presence in Country Viewed [M. Wagrowska; RZECZPOSPOLITA 8 May]	24
Soviet Troops Vacate Swidnica, Move to Legnica [Warsaw TV 9 May]	26
Army Paper on Warsaw Pact's Future [J. Markowski; ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ 14 May]	26

ROMANIA

Neagu Addresses UN Disarmament Commission [ROMPRES 19 May]	27
--	----

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA

Navy Incorporates Missile-Launching Corvette [LA PRENSA 6 May]	28
--	----

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Minister: No Change in Missile Development Program [Delhi Radio 23 May]	29
---	----

SOVIET UNION

Commentary on British Defense White Paper [V. Chernyshev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Apr]	30
Correspondent Visits Dismantled Missile Base [V. Karimov; PRAVDA VOSTOKA 20 Apr]	30

WEST EUROPE

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Worldwide Arms Makers Adjust to New Market [A.C. Allebeck; Copenhagen INFORMATION 1 Apr]	33
NATO's Woerner on Unification, Strategy [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 9 May]	37
Bonn's Envoy on CFE Vienna Negotiations [E. Stein; Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT 9 May]	38
Stoltenberg Views Disarmament, Calgary Meeting [G. Stoltenberg; Cologne Radio 11 May]	40
NATO Chief on Role of GDR, Soviet Union [Hamburg DPA 13 May]	41
Genscher Addresses IPU Meeting [Hamburg DPA 20 May]	41

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Stoltenberg Supports Third Zero Option [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 11 May]	42
Social Democrats Reject New Nuclear Missiles [East Berlin ADN 11 May]	42

Meckel Rejects Membership in Two Alliances	[FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 11 May]	42
Government Prevents Smuggling of Plant to Libya	[DIE WELT 12 May]	43
USSR Halts Troop Withdrawal From GDR	[DPA 16 May]	43
Stoltenberg Views Goals of NATO Meeting	[SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 22 May]	44

FRANCE

Thomson-CSF, BA Cooperate on Tactical Missiles		
	[LA LETTRE HEBDOMADAIRE DU GIFAS No 1506-1, 8 Mar]	44
Arms Agreements Will Engender More Sophisticated Systems		
	[J-P. Casamayou; L'USINE NOUVELLE 8 Mar]	44
Paris Paper Views Bush's Missile Decision	[LE MONDE 5 May]	45

NETHERLANDS

Nerve Gas Technology to Iran Prevented	[K. Colijn, P. Rusman; VRIJ NEDERLAND 17 Mar]	46
Chemical Weapons Technology Supplied to Libya		
	[K. Colijn, P. Rusman; VRIJ NEDERLAND 24 Mar]	48

UNITED KINGDOM

Defense Secretary on Talks in USSR	[C. Miller; PRESS ASSOCIATION 18 May]	49
King Warns Against Abandoning NATO	[G. Meade; PRESS ASSOCIATION 22 May]	50
Defense Secretary Warns of Arms Treaty Delay	[G. Meade; PRESS ASSOCIATION 22 May]	50

Article Views Changes in Warsaw Pact

HK1705064190 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese
No 8, 16 Apr 90 pp 20-22

[Article by Xiao Bin (2556 2919): "Where Will the Warsaw Pact Go?"—first paragraph is SHIJIE ZHISHI introduction]

[Text] The drastic turbulence in the Soviet and East European situation has made a violent impact on the traditional status and role of the Warsaw Pact, bringing about momentous changes in the pact in 1989. The German unification course also exerts a delicate but important influence on the Warsaw Pact.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization will have been set up for 35 years by May of this year. The Warsaw Pact defense ministers meeting held last November decided that the organization will not hold major celebration activities to mark its 35th anniversary and that each member state may hold separate celebrations according to circumstances. People hold that the low key attitude toward the 35th anniversary of the pact has something to do with the drastic changes happening in the political situation of East European states, indicating that there will be major changes in the pact.

The Outcome of Cold War

Soon after World War II, East European states embarked on the socialist road by setting up the people's democratic regime one after another. In 1949, to prevent the growth of Soviet influence, Western countries headed by the United States set up a military alliance in Europe, namely, NATO, to confront the East European socialist states. Since then, the United States and the Soviet Union have turned from antifascist allies into antagonists of mutual contention and the East-West relations have become increasingly tense. At that time, the position of Federal Germany was very sensitive. To prevent it from joining NATO, the Soviet Union launched a tit-for-tat struggle against the United States. In 1955, however, Federal Germany eventually joined NATO. In May of the same year, the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, the FRG, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary signed a "Treaty of Friendly Cooperation and Mutual Help" in Warsaw and set up a military and political alliance, namely, the "Warsaw Treaty Organization." With the founding of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, a posture of confrontation between the two major military blocs in the East and West took shape, which marked the beginning and escalation of the cold war.

After the war, the Soviet Union did not withdraw its troops from Poland, the GDR, and Hungary. After signing the Warsaw Treaty, it sent, according to the treaty, military advisor teams to various East European states to help with military training. Since the 1960's, the Warsaw Pact has made further efforts to set up united Armed Forces, which was formed by troops of the Soviet Union and other signatory states, with high-ranking

Soviet general as commander in chief. Following the Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union also stationed troops in Czechoslovakia. The number of Soviet troops stationed in East Europe increased to 31 divisions, roughly 650,000 troops in all. Later, Soviet troops formed an "integrated unit" with troops from Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the GDR, which frequently conducted various joint military exercises in the territories of signatory countries in a planned way. Thus, the Soviet Union intensified its control over Warsaw Pact countries and, at the same time, stepped up military confrontation with NATO.

The Warsaw Pact is an important force with which the Soviet Union contends with NATO in Europe in the political, military, propaganda, and psychological fields. On the one hand, the Soviet Union vigorously develops its military strength. The famous medium-range missile crisis in Europe has precisely occurred under this condition. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has launched repeated peace disarmament offensives against NATO through the pact.

Historic Changes

Since the latter half of the 1980's, the Soviet Union has constantly readjusted its policy toward East Europe and changed its previous practice of exercising strict control over East Europe, indicating that all East European states may determine their own internal affairs. Given such circumstances, the East European member states called for reform of Warsaw Pact's internal relations and its mechanism and stressed the equal rights of all Warsaw Pact states.

In 1989, momentous changes took place in the Warsaw Pact. At the pact summit in July 1989, Gorbachev said that "all countries have the rights to work out their own political lines without any outside interference" and that it is necessary to "develop multilateral cooperation on the basis of peace and mutual respect." He also said that the Warsaw Pact should "change from a military and political organization into a political and military one." For this reason, the summit meeting formally decided to partially reorganize the leading structure of the Warsaw Pact by establishing the post of secretary general in order to better coordinate the political and diplomatic actions of the pact. Meanwhile, for the first time in over 30 years, the organization admitted in its conference document that all states "have the right to choose the pattern of socialist development." After the summit, given the background of major changes in their political situations, all East European states placed more stress on the need to speed up the internal reform of the Warsaw Pact. Polish foreign minister especially pointed out, the Warsaw Pact should become "an alliance with political rather than military affairs as the main content." Hungary maintained that the Warsaw Pact "should become a bloc with a stronger political coloring." The Czechoslovak foreign minister hoped that the Warsaw Pact would "reform the overall structure of international

relations." New Romanian leader Ion Iliescu said that "the Warsaw Pact is no longer a military pact organization and it should develop into a political alliance of all countries in the region." At the Warsaw Pact foreign minister meeting held on last 17 March, the foreign ministers of seven member states simultaneously pointed out that both the Warsaw Pact and NATO should "shift their work from military to political issues," so that the two blocs "become, first and foremost, political organizations." Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also said that in the future, the Warsaw Pact's "military factor will increasingly become a secondary one."

Because the Warsaw Pact member states stress equal status among them and because of changes in the internal relations of the Warsaw Bloc, the Warsaw Pact countries have challenged some major, sensitive historical issues. The most notable one is the dispatch of troops in 1968 to Czechoslovakia by the five Warsaw Pact countries, namely, the Soviet Union, the GDR, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Poland and Hungary were the first to publicly censure this action as invasion. At the Warsaw Pact summit on 4 December last year, the five countries taking part in the action issued a joint statement, announcing that "the dispatch of troops to Czechoslovakia in August 1968 constitutes an interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and this action should be censured." Meanwhile, the Soviet Government also issued an separate statement on this issue, admitting that "the decision to send troops at that time was wrong," thus *determining the nature of dispatching troops to Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and four other countries as invasion and thoroughly negating Brezhnev's "theory of limited sovereignty?"*

Following the drastic changes in the situation, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland also *called on the Soviet Union to speed up the withdrawal of all its troops from these countries.* Recently, Czechoslovakia signed an agreement with the Soviet Union on the question of Soviet troop withdrawal, under which the Soviet Union agrees to pull out all its 73,500 troops from Czechoslovakia by 1 July 1991 in three stages. The Soviet Union and Hungary have also signed an agreement on troop withdrawal, in which it is stipulated that all Soviet troops will have withdrawn from Hungary by 30 June 1991. At the Warsaw Pact foreign minister meeting last October, the Polish foreign minister said that "the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland will lose its military significance. On two occasions Polish Solidarity Chairman Lech Walesa said that the Soviet Union should pull out its troops from Poland because "the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland has a greater psychological role than the military one." President Jaruzelski also said that if it is possible to ensure a "favorable situation to Poland," he will "agree to the withdrawal of Soviet troops." Curie [ju xi 1446 6007], chairman of the GDR Democratic Socialist Party, put forward a peace and disarmament proposal on 6 January of this year, to the effect that both East and West Germans cut their troops by 50 percent

respectively. In a statement, the Soviet Government also claimed that, if the Polish Government should raise it, the Soviet Union will discuss with Poland the question of stationing Soviet troops in Poland. The Soviet Union has unilaterally cut its troops stationed in the GDR. Apparently, it is inevitable that Soviet troops will pull out of East Europe.

Differences Resulting From the Question of German Unification

With the acceleration of the German unification process, out of their own interests, the Warsaw Pact countries *have differences of view on such issues as the question of military subordination of the future unified Germany, the method of German unification, and the "security guarantee" resulting from German unification.* On 17 March, the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers committee held a special meeting to discuss the question of German unification. The participants first expressed their approval of German unification, holding this as a "natural process." But Poland and Czechoslovakia, which are most sensitive to German unification, opposed the idea of German neutralization put forward by the Soviet Union and the GDR. Poland and Czechoslovakia held that the participation of a unified Germany in NATO is "positive and constructive" and that "only NATO's political and military structure can keep a unified Germany under control." The Czechoslovak foreign minister said: "A neutral Germany will be the worst option." The Polish foreign minister especially stressed, allowing a unified Germany to remain in NATO is "the most realistic" because Germany's neutrality will enable it to "embark on a development path detrimental to Europe." The Polish Government also indicated that, due to changes in the European situation, Poland will not for the time being ask Soviet troops to pull out of Poland. In light of these circumstances, observers analyze that, on the one hand, Soviet troop withdrawal from Poland and the GDR involves the stability of the European situation and the commitments of the four major powers, namely, the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France, to station troops in Germany and, therefore, the question is fairly complicated; on the other hand, because there is a divergence of views among the Warsaw Pact countries on the status of unified Germany, this issue can hardly be completely solved in the near term.

Delicate Prospects

If the relaxation of East-West relations, especially the progress in U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks, has reduced the status and role of the Warsaw Pact externally, the drastic historical changes in the political situation of the East European countries have an impact on the political and military structures of the Warsaw Pact, as well as its policies. Such a strong impact has led some experts in international affairs to predict that the Warsaw Pact will disintegrate by itself. However, since the question of German unification heats up, there seems to be a delicate change in the Warsaw Pact's direction. At the Warsaw Pact foreign minister meeting on 17 March, the

seven foreign ministers especially stressed that the question of German unification has become the focus of the European political pattern. Therefore, "both the Warsaw Pact and NATO should be preserved for a certain period of time." To guarantee their own diverse interests, all East European states have openly indicated one after another that they would not withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and would continue to fulfill their obligations to the pact. The deputy chief of staff of the Hungarian Army explicitly indicated that Hungary would "get political and economic benefits by staying in the Warsaw Pact at present." Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel proclaimed that Czechoslovakia would continue to stay in the pact, saying that, if we "withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, we should lose our influence over it" and that we will promote the realization of a "new security system" in Europe from "within the Warsaw Pact?"

Apparently, the Warsaw Pact will continue to exist for some time. However, experts in international affairs generally hold that it will no longer be an organization speaking with one voice as it did in the past and that, instead of attaching importance to the interest of the bloc as they did in the past, all members states will proceed from their own national interests and attach more importance to safeguarding their own interests. At present, the Warsaw Pact has changed and will continue to change. A director of the Soviet General Staff Headquarters said that the Warsaw Pact "will still undergo some changes in the field of organization" because in East European countries "the Communist Party no longer leads the state" and, therefore, the Warsaw Pact's "political consultative council will probably exist no longer" but "another supreme body will perhaps be set up." The Hungarian Congress recently decided that the president of the Hungarian Republic will join the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Council on behalf of Hungary. The reason is that Hungary has instituted a multiparty system and that the future government does not belong to any party. There are also very similar situations in other East European member states.

The Soviet Union has on many occasions indicated its unwillingness to permanently split Europe into two mutually antagonistic blocs. It calls for the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO and the establishment of a European mansion. Talking about foreign policy issues at the Supreme Soviet on 23 February this year, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reaffirmed the Soviet stand to simultaneously dissolve the two major military and political blocs in Europe. Polish President Jaruzelski also said the Warsaw Pact and NATO would "probably be dissolved within this century."

How will the Warsaw Pact change? What is its prospect? These are still major issues of concern to international observers.

Appendix: Statistics on Warsaw Pact Troops Stationed in Europe

Type	Number of Troops
Total Military Strength	3,573,000
Personnel of Commanding Organs	30,200
Ground Force, as Well as Its Air Force	1,823,500
Air Defense Units	550,500
Air Force	425,100
Navy	338,000
Reconnaissance, Liaison, and Military Academy Personnel	255,400
Rear-guard Units	146,300
Civil Defense Units	34,100
Frontline Aircraft (Air Force, Air Defense, and Navy)	7,876
Tactical Aircraft	5,355
Interceptors	1,829
Naval Fighters	692
Total Number of Air Force Bombers	2,783
Helicopter Gunships	2,785
Tactical Missile Launchers	1,608
Tanks	59,470
Antitank Missile Devices	11,465
Armored Carriers	70,330
Rocket Launchers, Guns, and Mortars	71,560
Submarines (Not Carrying Strategic Missiles)	200
All Kinds of Large Surface Vessels	102
Aircraft Carriers	2
Landing Ships	24
Vessels Carrying Mobile Missiles	23

Changing U.S. Defense Strategy Discussed

HK1205091490 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
11 May 90 p 4

["Roundup" by Zhang Yunwen (1728 0336 2429):
"Readjustment of U.S. Defense Strategy in Europe"]

[Text] President Bush announced that through negotiations with U.S. allies, it had been decided that the project of renovating "Lance," the short-range nuclear guided missile, would be halted; at the same time, updated nuclear artillery shells would no longer be deployed in Europe. This was stated at a news conference in Washington on 3 May. President Bush stated that the United States plans to begin talks with the USSR on short-rangenuclear weapons in Europe immediately after initialing an agreement on cuts in conventional forces at

the Vienna talks this fall. The United States has relaxed on this point. NATO's original position was that such talks would begin only on the condition that the USSR begins its implementation of the negotiations on regular forces. At the same time, U.S. Secretary of State Baker relayed the aforesaid U.S. proposal to the allies at the special meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels. It is believed that the U.S. decision is a readjustment of its defense strategy in Europe; public opinion called it "the most important change in the Atlantic Alliance since France withdrew from the unified NATO defense organization in 1966."

The USSR has expressed that it welcomes this. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze believed that the decision was "a good one," and "has inspired" the USSR. The foreign ministers at the NATO meeting in Brussels expressed their unanimous approval for this U.S. proposal. The British and French leaders who were meeting each other also expressed their support for the U.S. proposal. West German Foreign Minister Genscher believed that the proposal was "promoting the progress of German reunification."

It has been expected that the United States would give up the project of renovating most of the outmoded "Lance" missiles and nuclear artillery deployed inside West Germany; but it was quite unexpected that the decision had been made so fast. Obviously that was closely connected with the development of the European situation.

Since the U.S.-USSR treaty on intermediate-range guided missiles was initiated in 1987, the fate of short-range nuclear weapons with a range under 500 km that are deployed in Europe has been conspicuous. With both sides removing medium-range guided missiles, the United States considered renovating its approximately 1,400 nuclear artillery shells with a range of about 20 km and approximately 700 "Lance" missiles with a range of about 100 km chiefly deployed in West Germany. However, West Germany's opposition led to long-term controversies inside NATO. In the wake of heated debate at the 1989 NATO summit meeting, a compromise was reached on postponing the project of updating short-range guided missiles until the cuts in conventional forces became effective and were implemented before talks with the USSR on short-range guided missiles began.

NATO deployed land-based short-range missiles in Western Europe to counter the superiority of Soviet conventional forces. However, with the sharp change in the situation in Eastern Europe and withdrawal of Soviet forces from there, the military confrontation between the East and West blocs is not as acute as it was before, and the importance of these short-range nuclear missiles has declined. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider the plan for updating the missiles. The readjustment of this strategic defense has been under discussion for some time. The increased pace of German reunification and

pressure from the U.S. Congress and its allied countries compelled the U.S. Government to step up its effort in this respect.

Observers believe that apart from responding to the current changing situation in Europe, the U.S. strategic readjustment represents a gesture to reassure the Soviet Union in the hope that the latter will continue making concessions on disarmament in Europe.

For the United States itself, giving up the plan to update short-range nuclear missiles serves to pacify those who advocate cutting troops stationed in Europe. Although the work of developing new short-range missiles has been accomplished, the U.S. Congress has made it clear that it would not approve the funds needed for updating the missiles.

The plan for updating the short-range missiles has encountered strong political resistance in West Germany. Under the new situation of speeding up the reunification process in Germany, it is more difficult for West Germany to accept the deployment of new-type short-range missiles on its land, because "the shorter the range, the more fatal to Germany." Furthermore, storing nuclear warheads is a money-consuming and dangerous matter. At present, updating the short-range missiles deployed in West Germany is undoubtedly a stumbling block to German reunification.

The present problem is whether the readjustment of the defense strategy of NATO in Europe can lead to the success of the "third zero point proposal,"—namely, the denuclearization of Germany. Bush has clearly pointed out that the United States intends to maintain a combined conventional and nuclear force in Europe, and that it will not withdraw all nuclear weapons from Western Europe. Since nuclear weapons will become a deterrent force, the United States does not want Europe to become a place "where only conventional war can be successfully fought." For this reason, while suspending the plan for modernizing short-range missiles in Europe, the United States is also planning to replace its nuclear artillery shells with new long-range strategic air-to-land missiles. It hopes that these missiles can be deployed in European countries other than Germany. But the problem is that under the new situation, European countries except Great Britain probably might refuse to deploy the air-based nuclear weapons on their territory. In addition, the Soviet Union has also opposed the plan. This has created new difficulties for the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks. Therefore, it is now still too early to predict the future nuclear situation in Europe.

U.S. Arms Control Tactics Viewed

*OW1805100790 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
No 20, 14-20 May pp 8-11*

[Article by Hu Yumin: "U.S. Tactics Employed in Arms Control Talks"]

[Text] More and more evidence has indicated that U.S. President George Bush is determined to sign a treaty to cut strategic weapons by half and one to reduce conventional forces in Europe. These two treaties will lead to a

considerable reduction in the level of military confrontation between the East and West and usher in a changed U.S.-Soviet relationship. Meanwhile, the United States and the Soviet Union are close to concluding agreements cutting chemical weaponry and verifying the implementation of the treaty on limiting underground nuclear testing. During his presidency more arms control agreements are likely to be signed than during any other, making Bush one of the most accomplished U.S. presidents since World War II.

Accomplishments

Bush arrived in the White House on 20 January 1989, a time when the international situation was undergoing drastic changes, presenting both opportunity and challenges to his arms control policies. In a little more than a year's time, the Bush administration adopted a series of noticeable steps and had won the upper hand in rivalry with the Soviet Union.

In the first place, Bush ordered a re-examination of Washington's arms control policies. After his inauguration, Bush was cautious in adopting major measures in arms control talks with the Soviets, because he thought his policies had not yet taken shape and that the time was not ripe for him to advance any initiatives.

At that time, East-West tensions eased as a result of the signing and implementation of the treaty on reducing the two superpowers' intermediate-range nuclear forces. However, voices of protest within the administration and U.S. Congress against strategic arms cuts were still loud. The Congress, dominated by Democrats, could take advantage of any mistakes the Republican Bush might make. The still uncertain political situation in the Soviet Union prompted skepticism in military and political circles in Washington. West European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, suspicious of any secret deal between the two superpowers without their participation, opposed any reduction in their strategic forces before the threat of Soviet conventional forces was removed.

Under the circumstances, Bush adopted a wait-and-see attitude. He postponed the resumption of the 11th round of U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic weapons and ordered the U.S. delegation to hold its ground in the European conventional forces talks. While reviewing U.S. arms control policies, Bush shuffled between the U.S. Government and Congress and the allies to coordinate their policies.

After a period of observation, Bush decided to put the emphasis of negotiations with the Soviets on conventional disarmament. This is due in part to the West European countries' strong demand that the threat of Soviet conventional arms be removed and in part to Moscow's concessions in conventional disarmament talks.

After announcing a unilateral cut of 500,000 troops in late 1988, the Soviet Union unexpectedly accepted in

March 1989 the proposal that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact cut the number of their tanks to 20,000. Under the plan, the Warsaw Pact would reduce 33,000 tanks in return for NATO's dismantling of 3,600.

In response, while attending a NATO summit last May, Bush advanced a "four-point plan" to accelerate the European conventional disarmament process. The proposal suggested that both the United States and the Soviet Union reduce their Europe-stationed troops to 275,000 and their fighter planes and helicopters to a level that was 15 percent lower than the current NATO strength. The proposal also suggested that an agreement on European conventional disarmament be reached within six to 12 months, and that it be implemented before 1993. The plan accepted the Soviet stand that fighter planes, helicopters and troops be included in negotiations, which greatly narrowed the gap between the two sides, and proposed a date for signing the agreement seven years earlier than the Soviet version. This changed the passive image of the United States in negotiations.

Bush then sped up the negotiation process. The progress of conventional disarmament talks and Soviet concessions in strategic arms talks prompted Bush to bring strategic arms talks "back into the limelight." Agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States was reached on the number of tanks, armoured personnel carriers and helicopters in September 1989, when the third round of European conventional arms talks ended. In that same month, during a meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, the Soviet Union made two major concessions in strategic arms talks. First, it dropped its insistence on the linkage between the signing of a treaty on strategic arms and a solution to the problem of space weapons. Second, it agreed to separate sea-based cruise missiles from the treaty to be dealt with independently.

To test the waters in Moscow, Bush invited Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to an informal summit in Malta last December. Gorbachev's attitude towards the events in Eastern Europe convinced Bush that the "optimum opportunity" for a breakthrough in arms control talks had come. In Baker's words: "If you're not certain about Gorbachev's future, that is all the more reason to move quickly to lock in these arms control agreements, which will bind his successors." In this light, Bush decided to accelerate the negotiation process and to strive for the signing of a treaty on cutting strategic weapons in half a year's time.

Tactics

Throughout U.S.-Soviet negotiations, Bush has followed the policies of the Reagan Administration in key areas. Admittedly, almost all of the results his government has achieved so far have been largely due to concessions made by the Soviet Union. Still, Bush has used different tactics in the talks than his predecessor.

Bush has insisted on seeking a low-level balance with the Soviet Union in areas where Moscow enjoys an edge over Washington through "asymmetrical reductions." The purpose of the United States was to heighten its superiority in weaponry, extend its strategic initiative and strengthen its position as a military superpower.

Because of the Bush Administration's "common ceiling" policy over the military strength in Europe, the Warsaw Pact agreed during conventional disarmament talks to reduce the number of its tanks by eight times more than NATO, and the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw 300,000 more troops from Europe than the United States. This will basically remove the Soviet Union's capability to launch a massive conventional attack on NATO.

In chemical disarmament talks, the Bush Administration successfully persuaded the Soviet Union to agree to a trade-off. That is, the United States will eliminate 24,000 tons of obsolete weapons while the Soviet Union cuts 44,000 tons of weapons that are still in use. The Soviets also allowed the U.S. Government to preserve the right of producing new binary chemical weapons until an international agreement on completely banning the production and use of chemical weapons was reached. The trade-off will alter the U.S. Government's subordinate position in the field of chemical weapons.

In talks concerning the reduction of strategic weapons, the Soviet Union has agreed to reduce 2,000 more missile warheads than the United States. This will result in the Soviet Union losing half of its SS-18 missiles and warheads, which have the capability of hitting targets in the United States. Such a situation will enable U.S. land-based missiles to outlast any Soviet offensive, and the balance between the two superpowers in nuclear strength will alter in favour of the United States.

However, when negotiations switched to areas where the United States has kept its superiority, the Bush Administration refused to negotiate. For example, although Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed the importance of reducing the strength of each superpower's navy, and at last December's meeting in Malta appealed for the establishment of a "non-nuclear Mediterranean," Bush ignored the requests. On the contrary, U.S. sea-based cruise missiles have been successfully excluded from the agreement on strategic weapons reduction. As well, in order to establish an offensive and defensive nuclear strategic system, the Bush Administration has refused to make any concessions to Soviet demand to scale back on space weapons.

In its efforts to remove Soviet threat to the West, the U.S. Government has tried to trim its rival's military strength. But at the same time, dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the process of German unification have required the United States to cooperate with the Soviet Union to prevent the situation from getting out of hand.

Earlier this year in February, Bush suggested limiting the number of U.S. and Soviet troops in Europe to 195,000 per side, which was 80,000 fewer than the number he had suggested last year and 150,000 fewer than what the Soviet Union suggested. Bush also proposed that the Soviet Union allow the United States to station another 30,000 troops in Britain and southern Europe. This proposal appears unreasonable. But Bush has his own reasons for suggesting it.

The Soviet troop withdrawal from Europe has become an irreversible trend since the dramatic changes in the Eastern Europe. A total of 127,000 Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia and Hungary are expected to be withdrawn within a year and a half, and the date for reducing 400,000 Soviet troops in the German Democratic Republic and Poland is approaching. In view of these developments, whether the Soviet Union can keep 195,000 troops in Eastern Europe in the coming years remains a question. Bush's suggestion to reduce the maximum number of troops stationed in Europe apparently is to put the Soviet Union on an equal footing with the United States and to ease the pressure under which Moscow has to unilaterally withdraw troops. But what is more important is that by setting up the "common ceiling," Bush legalized the continuing stationing of U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe in the hope of future cooperation with Soviet Union to influence German unification. Because Bush's proposal reflected Gorbachev's wishes, the Soviet Union barely hesitated in accepting it completely on 19 February.

Coordinating its policies with its allies is the main way the U.S. Government strengthens its position in negotiations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, out of its long-term strategic need, Washington wants to adjust its security relations with Europe.

To face a reduced U.S. military presence in Europe and increasingly complicated relations with Britain, France, and West Germany on security matters, Bush must adjust his foreign policy. It now is directed towards West Germany.

In order to gain the support of West Germany in negotiations with the Soviet Union, Bush broke the routine of the Reagan Administration when the meeting in Malta ended. The usual procedure was to give details of the meeting to the leader of Britain first, but Bush talked with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl first. The U.S. President encouraged West Germany to play a more important role in Europe and promised to make concessions to Bonn on renewing NATO's short-range missiles. After leaving Britain out in the cold, Bush then tried to mend relations with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who had warned him that an overly rapid process towards disarmament would create new risks. The Bush Administration had consulted with Britain before it proposed to establish a ceiling on the number of American and Soviet troops in Europe. Britain finally agreed to Bush's maximum ceiling of 195,000 although it contended that that should be the

lowest number. In order to avoid arguments with Britain over Thatcher's demand that British troops always be stationed in Germany and the French demand that it retain its advantageous position in dealing with Germany, the Bush Administration resisted Soviet pressure to include 120,000 French and British troops in West Germany as part of the United States' contingent of troops stationed overseas.

Prospects

Now, two draft treaties on reducing strategic weapons and conventional forces in Europe have nearly been completed with major obstacles basically removed. Despite critical opinion from the U.S. Congress on some items, most members feel the treaties are in keeping with the United States' strategic interests. Provided there are no unforeseen developments, the signing and approving of the treaties can be expected. So that Bush Administration has begun to formulate the next phase in disarmament negotiations while continuing the current negotiations and removing minor obstacles.

By its geopolitical strategy, the United States has always tried to block any other power, the Soviet Union or Germany, from dominating Europe. Now that the Soviet influence in Europe has been further weakened and the two Germanies have sped up the process towards unification without signing peace treaties with their neighbouring countries, the United States will try to safeguard the delicate balance, seeking to restrict Germany from expanding militarily and in the area of security.

To this end, the United States is considering to couple Europe's disarmament course with its future security arrangements. Therefore, it's possible that the United States will focus on limiting arms in Germany after unification during the second phase of negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe. The United States will also back the Soviet Union in keeping a small number of troops in the eastern part of Germany and safeguarding its strategic passageway to Germany through Poland. Washington will seek to maintain the balance of military forces of all parties, including establishing the position of East European countries in a security set-up with Soviet cooperation.

The Bush Administration's "Report of the Secretary of Defence to the President and the Congress in 1990" indicates that the United States will further reduce its arms; its defence spending in 1991 will be \$303.3 billion, 2 percent lower than that of 1990; and troop levels will drop to 2.04 million from 2.077 million. Afterwards, the United States will continue arms reductions. The report also points out that because "an aggregate military capability (of the Soviet Union) continues to pose a potential threat to the interests of the United States and its allies," the United States must utilize its superiority in technology and weapons. While continuing arms reductions on both sides, Washington will try to strengthen its superiority in the structure and quality of its arms. To vie for superiority in high technology is the most important means by which the United States hopes to

keep its deterrent capacity. The United States will maintain its tough position on space weapons, continue to develop new nuclear weapons and be opposed to negotiating comprehensive nuclear test bans.

The United States feels the unprecedented political changes in the Soviet Union and changes in the power balance have made the superpowers increase their understanding and cooperation in seeking their common goals. Those goals include reaching further treaties on arms control, strengthening confidence-building measures and reducing military confrontations. This will expand the foundation for constructive dialogue and cooperation, prompt the two superpowers into establishing a new strategic relationship in Europe and in the world, and cooperate in dealing with regional conflicts.

For this reason, the United States will try to formulate "a strategically farsighted and politically acceptable plan to the Soviets." As for conventional disarmament in Europe, the United States will try to recognize that the Soviet Union has extremely important national interests in Democratic Germany in return for the Soviet withdrawal of troops in a way that is reassuring to the East Europeans.

In the field of international and multilateral arms control, especially the questions of nuclear and chemical weapons and missile non-proliferation, the United States will seek cooperation from the Soviet Union in order to exert pressure on other countries, especially Third World nations. Some U.S. experts on arms control advance the theory that because the Soviet Union wants naval forces reduced, the United States will be able to scale back on the number of its aircraft carriers in return for the Soviet Union cutting back on the number of its offensive submarines. In order to build a new strategic relationship with the Soviets, the United States needs to back Moscow's current policies and maintain the momentum in disarmament talks. By doing this, the United States will make it difficult for Gorbachev's successor to reverse the disarmament process.

In general, two factors have allowed Bush to pursue his arms control policy [for which] the Reagan Administration laid the foundation and, more importantly, the Soviet Union readjusted its foreign policy.

Bush, however, faces some difficult problems. The Soviet Union is, after all, a superpower which can match and destroy the United States. Still unsettled is to what degree the Soviet Union will allow the United States to gain in superiority, especially in the development of a space-based anti-missile defence system, otherwise known as "Star Wars" programme. The United States wants to strengthen its military competitive mechanism to gain superiority while, on the other hand, it also needs to restrict the mechanism in order to establish its new strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. This has created many differences of opinion on policy inside the Bush Administration. Because the Western allies have failed to agree on a long-term objective, their differences

will become more prevalent as disarmament negotiations continue. Prospects of new turbulence in Europe and other regions will also expose Bush's policy on arms control to more risks and force his administration to meet more challenges.

Japan's Kaifu Urges Soviet Arms Cuts in Region

*OW2205002890 Beijing XINHUA in English
1407 GMT 21 May 90*

[Text] Tokyo, May 21 (XINHUA)—Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu today urged the Soviet Union to reduce further Soviet arms in the Far East as a precursor to improved international relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

Kaifu made the remarks at a session of the House of Councilors Budget Committee.

The Japanese Prime Minister expressed concern over the military threat from the Soviet Far East.

During the same session, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama said the reduction of Soviet armed forces in the Far East will be high on the agenda when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visits Japan.

Shevardnadze's visit to Japan, designed to pave the way for a trip to Japan by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, was originally scheduled for March this year, but was cancelled due to unrest in the Soviet Union. No new date has been set.

Delegate Speaks at UN Parliamentary Disarmament Conference

*OW2205063990 Beijing XINHUA in English
0551 GMT 22 May 90*

[Text] Bonn, May 21 (XINHUA)—China put forward plans for widespread cuts in nuclear weapons when the First

World Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Disarmament opened here today under the backing of the United Nations.

Several hundred MP's and experts from 61 countries are attending the five-day conference.

The Chinese delegation leader Zeng Tao put forward three proposals. These were that the United States and Soviet Union should take the lead in stopping nuclear tests, production, and deployment, and reduce nuclear weapons of all kinds at home or abroad by a wide margin; all nations owning nuclear weapons should promise not to be the first to use them; all nations, principally the United States and Soviet Union, should completely withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed abroad.

He also pointed that it was necessary to deal with and develop relations among nations at the present time on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. International security and world peace could be maintained on these principles in place of power politics and the arms race.

During today's general debate, 26 MP's put forward their views on the current disarmament and the changes this has brought about in international relations.

The Federal German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, told the conference that German unity would contribute to peace in Europe, rejecting the power [word indistinct] of the past.

Genscher also expressed his support for the rapid reduction in strategic weapons between the United States and Soviet Union, stressing that no country should maintain a military force more than its real needs for collective or self-defence.

JAPAN

Nakayama Says Soviet Military Threat Receding

OW1105051290 Tokyo KYODO in English 0419 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Tokyo, May 11 (KYODO)—Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama said Friday the Soviet military threat in the Asia-Pacific region is receding. It was the first time that Nakayama officially acknowledged a reduction in the Soviet threat in the region.

Nakayama, however, told the House of Councillors budget committee Japan and the United States share the view that the Soviet military presence in the region still remains a big threat. The government has insisted that Japan should maintain its current defense policies despite tension easing in East-West relations and changes toward democracy in Eastern Europe. The government argues that the impact of these changes has not yet been felt in the region.

During the same session, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu said Japan will use the visit to Japan by South Korean President No Tae-u between May 24-26 to make public not only to No but to all nations in the region its self-reflection over its past aggression in China, the Korean peninsula, and other Asian nations.

Nakayama said that the Asia-Pacific region needs to have an institution similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a forum for those in charge of foreign affairs to discuss promotion of regional peace.

Kaifu Calls for Soviet Arms Cut in Far East

OW2105112790 Tokyo KYODO in English 1055 GMT 21 May 90

[Text] Tokyo, May 21 (KYODO)—Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu called Monday for further Soviet arms cuts in the Far East to establish a new international order based on dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Kaifu, expressing concern over the military threat in the Soviet Far East, stressed the need for the Soviet Union to reduce its armed forces there as a precursor to improved international relations in the Asia-Pacific area.

Kaifu added Japan will use every opportunity to urge the Soviet union to reduce its armed forces in the Far East.

Kaifu made the remarks in response to questions posed by ruling Liberal Democratic Party member Hirofumi Nakasone at a session of the House of Councillors Budget Committee.

During the same session, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama said the reduction of Soviet armed forces in the Far East will be high on the agenda when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visits Japan.

Shevardnadze's visit to Japan, seen as paving the way for a trip to Japan by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, was originally scheduled for March but was canceled due to unrest in the Soviet Union. No new date has been set.

Nakayama expressed keen interest in the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), saying the talks will possibly have a great impact on international affairs.

MONGOLIA

Second Stage of Soviet Troop Withdrawal Begins

OW1505185990 Ulaanbaatar MONTSAME in English 1712 GMT 15 May 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 15 May (MONTSAME)—Second stage of the Soviet troops withdrawal from Mongolia started here today, 15 May. Their limited contingent was introduced into Mongolia on a temporary basis at the request of the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] Government in the mid-1960.

The first stage of the pull-out took place in May-August 1989 when an agreement was reached by the two governments to withdraw a "significant" 75 percent part of Soviet troops. Before that, in 1987, the USSR Government returned home a small part of the contingent as part of its effort to reduce the number of Soviet troops stationed in foreign countries.

Then, it was announced on March 2 of this year that a full withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from Mongolia would be carried out in 1991-1992, with the combat personnel pulled out fully within 1991 and the hardware and accompanying units in 1992.

The current withdrawal started simultaneously in several places. Three large groups counting a total of 26,800 troops, 436 tanks, 375 guns and mortars, 400 armored carriers and 5,430 pieces of other military hardware are leaving from the towns of Saynshand and Tshoir (south of the country), Baganuur and Nalayha (near Ulaanbaatar) and Doronod Province (extreme east of Mongolia).

Speaking at the farewell ceremony in Nalayha, Lieutenant-General L. Molomjamts, MPR defence minister, emphasized the international significance of the Soviet troops pull-out from Mongolia. He said that this step was prompted by the conclusions proceeding from the analysis of the current military-political situation in the world, the trends of its development and by the new conception of the defence and ensurance of the security of the country. The decision to withdraw Soviet troops from this country is an expression of the peaceloving policies of our two countries' governments aimed at strengthening trust among the states in the Asia-Pacific region and the world over, L. Molomjamts stated.

He also noted that the fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union would remain a decisive factor in ensuring the security of Mongolia and increasing her defence potential.

In line with a decree of the Presidium of the MPR People's Great Hural, L. Molomjamts presented to a number of Soviet servicemen the "nairjmdal" (friendship) medals and also the awards of the MPR Defence Ministry.

The Soviet troops are leaving behind about 50 settlements with all their infrastructure and 7 airfields which are to be handed over to the Mongolian side.

THAILAND

General Comments on Arms Procurement Policy

90WC0065B Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai
26 Feb 90 p 3

[Text] Major General Saengsak Mangkhalasiri, the secretary of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, talked with reporters about the Ministry of Defense

opening the largest explosives production plant in South-east Asia in Nakhon Sawan Province. He said that the plant is experiencing problems in disposing of all its products. This is because the plant's production capacity is very large, but we have few customers, which is due to the fact that this is a government unit. The plant is prohibited from using middlemen to sell items on commission.

The secretary of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense said that this is why the Ministry of Defense wants to ask the army, navy, and air force to purchase materials from this plant. Normally, the three services buy materials abroad for combat training, with the Bureau of the Budget stipulating the conditions.

Major General Saengsak said that the original target of the plant was to produce materials for the ASEAN countries. But because the fighting in these countries is declining, the plant can't sell all of the materials produced. However, the Ministry of Defense will coordinate the activities of the various services and ask our military attaches and assistant military attaches serving abroad to see if those countries are interested in purchasing materials and explosives from Thailand.

INTERBLOC AFFAIRS

Budapest Phase of 'Open Skies' Conference Ends

*LD1005202190 Budapest MTI in English 1945 GMT
10 May 90*

[Text] Budapest, May 10 (MTI)—The Budapest phase of the open skies conference, which lasted almost three weeks, closed with a plenary session here on Thursday.

As debates already indicated, the 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty member countries taking part were unable to reach agreement on several fundamental issues relating to the operation of the open skies system of mutual, unarmed surveillance flights.

For this reason, the original goal of presenting a complete document ready for the relevant foreign ministers to sign on May 10 has not been attained.

Participants at the Thursday plenary session laid down this fact, and expressed the hope that in the event of favourable political decisions, the conference could possibly resume its work in the near future and settle issues which are still open.

Speaking to journalists on Thursday, Tibor Toth, head of the Hungarian delegation, said he was hopeful that the open skies conference could be continued in the third quarter of this year, possibly in July.

Hungary is ready to provide all the necessary conditions for the continuation.

The participating states are expected to decide about a Hungarian proposal that the new round of talks be held in Budapest in June.

A favourable decision, though, depends on whether adequate political will is there for settling the disputed questions to general satisfaction: This would mainly be an agreement between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev during their forthcoming summit.

At the same time, Tibor Toth noted with satisfaction that major progress had been made in a number of partial fields, including the matter of onboard instruments.

Amending its previous, negative position, the Soviet Union agreed to the use of sensors able to operate in any weather conditions for 24 hours. It also made a concession as to the sensitivity of the instruments, approving the application of sensors which can identify objects the size of 30 centimetres, while in Ottawa it only approved a three-metre size. However, the Western countries are pushing for the use of even more sensitive instruments.

As to the moot point of the choice of plane, which also requires a politically compromising spirit, 22 delegations were all for the controlling side choosing the plane for the overflights, while the Soviet Union feels the country under survey should provide the aircraft.

Despite the sticking points on basic issues, the head of the Hungarian delegation was optimistic about the prospect of the conference coming to a successful conclusion.

He said, "the participants are doomed to success", and this would be beneficial to the whole of Europe.

BULGARIA

General Dobrev on Warsaw Pact Anniversary

*AU2105160190 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 15 May 90 pp 1, 4*

[Article by Khristo Dobrev, first deputy minister of national defense and Bulgarian People's Army chief of staff: "Factor of Peace"]

[Text] Today we mark the 35th anniversary of the Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty between eight East European countries which entered the annals of recent world history under the name of the Warsaw Pact.

This treaty was a historical requirement which emerged in the years of the "cold war," as a result of the NATO member-countries' overt threats against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Facing increasing military danger, our countries were forced to adopt collective measures for the consolidation of their defense capacity.

From the very beginning of its existence to this day, the Warsaw Pact organization has never threatened and does not threaten anyone. It has always been and still is the chief factor of safeguarding peace and stability in Europe.

In the firm resolve of defending the people's legitimate aspirations to live in peace and in a world free of wars and bloodshed, the Warsaw Pact member-countries exercise a sobering effect upon the forces to be carried away by the temptation of settling international controversies with the force of arms. The Warsaw Pact member-countries have contributed to the liberation of human society from the tragic cycle of military confrontation which was characteristic of the past, when peace was only a short recess between two world wars.

Guided by the conviction that eliminating the threat of universal nuclear and conventional war is a vitally important requirement for the survival of mankind, the Warsaw Pact member-states are perseveringly trying to apply all means and opportunities for the establishment and maintenance of non-confrontational relations with NATO member-countries and for a constructive dialogue on the methods of peaceful transition to a new international order for the achievement of a sensible agreement on rescuing Europe from the opposing military political blocs represented by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The first step along this path would be to disband their military organizations.

These efforts are not in vain. The signing of important international legal documents, such as the Stockholm document on confidence building measures and security in Europe and the INF Treaty, were unique acts unprecedented in the postwar history of our continent. The negotiations on reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe are successfully progressing. All achievements in this field have really contributed to a substantial alleviation of direct military confrontation, to the improvement of security and stability of international relations not only in Europe, but worldwide.

The fact that the People's Republic of Bulgaria joined the Warsaw Pact as a member enabled our country to develop as a sovereign and free state. Its defensive capacity and the combat readiness of our armed forces have increased. Bulgaria can rely on a modern army, capable of protecting the people's peaceful efforts and their freedom. Our army is well trained and prepared for joint actions with its allies in defeating any aggressor who might dare to invade Bulgaria's territory, and in restoring our country's territorial integrity and in protecting its state borders.

The Warsaw Pact resisted the temptation to engage in open confrontation. Its present task is to guarantee the security of the allied countries under the newly emerging circumstances. On an international scale, this task will be implemented under the circumstances of the new situation under which peoples and their governments are increasingly realizing that direct military confrontation is meaningless and they are accepting the idea of peaceful coexistence being the only chance of survival. As to the situation within the Warsaw Pact, it is characterized by processes developing at different paces and with different intensities and by radical political, economic, and social changes in nearly all member-countries.

The diversified development of such processes encourages some Western political experts in their delusions about a premature, one-sided disbanding of the Warsaw Pact organization. Such forecasts are too hasty and unfounded.

At the present stage of development in international relations, the preservation of the existing military blocs on our continent and the existing political and economic cooperation structures are necessary requirements, considering that NATO and the Warsaw Pact represent major centers of joint initiatives in international relations. The two organizations are important factors which are decisively influencing the stability of international relations among the states belonging to the two alliances. The statement made by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner in September 1989 to the effect that the two blocs will still exist in 2000, even if relations between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe should improve, is quite characteristic in this respect. The declaration of Lothar de Maziere, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, that his government will remain loyal to the Warsaw Pact is also very eloquent.

The statement of the Czechoslovak president and those of the Polish and Hungarian government leaders are in the same spirit.

The positive transformations in international life are accompanied by substantial changes in the nature of the Warsaw Pact organization, and in the mechanism of political and military cooperation within the framework of this organization. Remaining the chief factor guaranteeing the security of its member-countries, the Warsaw Pact is increasingly turning from a military-political organization into a political-military defense organization, and is expected to become a purely political alliance in the more distant future. The political functions of the organization are expected to increase, while non-military structures shall prevail. The multilateral relations between allied states shall be intensified and develop on the basis of equal rights and mutual understanding. Each country's right to develop its own political line, strategy, and tactics shall be respected.

The problems of the all-European process in all its aspects are expected to play a major role in the activities of the political cooperation organs. The development of political, economic, and human relations, the questions of disarmament, of confidence building, and security are expected to prevail in the field of mutual cooperation.

As far as military cooperation is concerned, the military aspects of disarmament and the reduction of armed forces and armaments, the questions of cooperation among the allied countries in the field of military-industrial activities, and the problems of conversion are expected to play a decisive role, along with the improvement of the organizational structures and the intensified coalition character and democratic spirit that is expected to prevail in the leadership of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces.

The division into blocs on our continent cannot go on forever, of course. The idea of establishing an all-European security system is increasingly prevailing in international affairs. The establishment of such a system is expected to be a complicated and difficult process, and requires a radical change in the nature and functions of both organizations. This requirement also applies to the basic principles on which mutual relations between the two blocs are built.

This requirement emerges with special force against the background of the forthcoming reunification of the two German states. The stand of the FRG and of its NATO allies on the GDR's nuclear integration with the NATO bloc, demanding that it should proceed simultaneously with the establishment of a united German state, is unacceptable for the Soviet Union and for the other Warsaw Pact member-countries involved, considering that it is likely to cause a serious disruption in the balance of forces on the continent and in mutual relations.

The differences of opinions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact related to the methods of settling this

exceptionally difficult problem are still unresolved for the time being. Let us hope that a sensible compromise solution, conforming with the national interests and security of all sides involved, will be reached.

The future will show the what we can expect from the specific solutions of these problems.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Bush's Lance Decision Viewed Favorably

AU1005105990 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech
5 May 90 p 5

["(VOD)"]-signed commentary: "Bush Has Broken the Nuclear Lance"]

[Text] By making one statement, President Bush has cut short the debate on modernizing short-range nuclear missiles, a debate which, according to necessity, was sometimes passionate and other times rather relaxed and had been hampering the disarmament agenda since the end of 1988. The U.S. President has therefore prepared a completely new pack of cards for European negotiating tables, which elegantly conceals the fact that, among other things, he has also disposed of some untenable positions.

Modernization, that is, replacing the obsolete Lance-type tactical missile—which has a range of approximately 130 km—with a new type with almost triple the range has lost all its rationale in recent months. The missiles with a most appropriate name—Lance means spear—had been deployed in West Europe as a deterrent against the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority. However, the wave of tanks, the specter of which until quite recently accompanied the West's wildest dreams, has been eliminated by time. If today the missiles are technically obsolete, they seem even more anachronistic when looked at from a policy perspective. The much feared wave of tanks from the East today exists, more or less, only on paper; in this way, the threat against which U.S. lances oriented their preventative edge has also dwindled away. What is more, 88 Lance missiles, along with their nuclear warheads, present an unseemly, almost impolite, image since, in view of their limited range, they would—rather paradoxically—only strike those Central European countries which have embarked on the road of democracy and which again are acknowledging one Europe.

By his decision (not only missiles but nuclear artillery are also involved), Bush has removed the shield from West Europe, which had been a reliable protection for it. Cautious voices are warning that he has prematurely broken his own nuclear lances as development in the USSR is incalculable. However, despite this unpleasant variant, the U.S. President can (just like the Europeans) gain far more than he can lose.

First and foremost, he has sent a clear signal to Moscow about his intentions. Discussions on short-range missiles should logically come in order after the successful denouement of the Vienna marathon on reducing conventional forces which, however, is not progressing as smoothly as it could. The fact that Bush has reversed this order makes it clear that he is extremely interested in unraveling the conventional tangle in Vienna. Apart from this, he is indirectly helping Gorbachev to swallow the bitter pill created by the problem of a united Germany's political apurtenance; it is already clear that the Germanys will fall into the North Atlantic alliance's embrace and will not become neutral as Moscow wishes. The Kremlin has to—nolens volens—agree and, in this instance, its final "da" will not hurt so much if NATO is strengthened by Germany but is weakened by the unilateral reduction in the number of U.S. nuclear weapons.

The U.S. President has also sent a very clear signal to his European allies who, for a long time, had skeptically followed the modernization plans. It follows from his mission that a Europe deprived of the U.S. nuclear umbrella will have to, more than it has during the past 40 years, get used to taking its own affairs into its own hands. Let us take from this what we would like to believe: The continent's new political map is already a fact.

Vacek Calls for 'Leaner' Army

PM0905121590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 May 90 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Defense Minister Colonel General M. Vacek by A. Shapovalov, especially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Prague; date not given: "Tomorrow Is the 45th Anniversary of Czechoslovakia's Liberation from Fascism: Loyalty to Alliance Commitments"—first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Prague—The theme of the interview with Colonel General M. Vacek, CSFR minister of national defense, by a TASS correspondent are the achievements with which the Czechoslovak Army approaches the 45th anniversary of the victory over Hitler's Germany and its outlook for the near future.

[Shapovalov] There is much talk at the moment about the anniversary of the rout of Hitler's Germany being marked differently in Czechoslovakia this year....

[Vacek] Your information is correct. The traditional annual celebrations of the rout of Hitler's Germany, the end of World War II in Europe, our people's antifascist struggle, and the completion of Czechoslovakia's liberation will, as from this year, assume a somewhat different character. We have given up military parades and also the staging of the Czechoslovak Spartakiad. The celebrations will be linked with specific places, citizens, and servicemen of the antifascist coalition. With a feeling of profound gratitude and respect we will commemorate the decisive role of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces and the massive casualties sustained by Soviet

servicemen during the liberation of our motherland. In view of the fact that information about the contribution of Western allies and the Czechoslovak resistance movement in the West was suppressed in the past, it has been decided to shift the focus of celebrations this year to Plzen, which was liberated by the U.S. Army.

The Czechoslovak Army will take an active part in the celebrations. Military oath-taking ceremonies will be held in the presence of parents, relatives, and representatives of the public, and festive gatherings will be held in units, staffs, and educational establishments and institutions during which the presidential decree and the minister of national defense's order will be read out. We are seeking to achieve an understanding of the historic traditions and their connection with the processes of renewal under way in the Czechoslovak Army in the course of the May festivities.

[Shapovalov] Talking about the reform which has been initiated in the Czechoslovak Army, could you outline its essence, principles, and objectives?

[Vacek] I must clarify that the use of the term "reform" is not entirely appropriate to describe the processes which are under way. It is, above all, a question of the democratization and humanization of army life. On the basis of the amendment of the fundamental law—the CSFR Constitution—or rather the repeal of the article on the leading role of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the state political system is switching to the principles of pluralist democracy. The Czechoslovak Army, as an instrument of the state, safeguards this process and also implements fundamental changes itself, both in the sphere of the theory of military building and in its practical life. To this end I have issued a number of orders which create conditions for the implementation of the new principles in accordance with the changes of the superior legislative power (the constitution, laws, and government and CSFR Federal Assembly decisions.) Another substantial change is the process of standing aloof from the party [nadpartijnosti], and also the implementation of measures to enhance specialist training and the quality of servicemen's knowledge. The objective is the restructuring of the army in order to raise it to a level which will make it possible, in accordance with the state's military doctrine, to join the overall system of European security on an equitable basis.

[Shapovalov] What is the purport of the amendments and additions to the Law on Universal Military Conscription which were adopted recently by the Federal Assembly?

[Vacek] These additions have to be rated positively. They take account of changes in international relations to which our state is contributing by specific steps in the sphere of reducing the numerical strength of armed forces and armaments. Simultaneously the Law on Universal Military Conscription is being brought in line with international treaties, for instance the international pact

on civil and political rights and the Treaty No. 29 on forced and compulsory labor.

An objective assessment of the changes in international relations, the need to abide by the international treaty on security and cooperation in Europe, and compliance with citizens' wishes are the main factors which brought about the need to renew the Law on Universal Conscription and the Discharge of Military Service.

The amendments introduced in the new law take account of the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency and combat readiness of Czechoslovakia's Armed Forces.

The reduction of compulsory military service to 18 months ensures the effective training of servicemen doing military service in all military occupational specialties. The withdrawal of the permission to use the Czechoslovak Army to assist the national economy has created conditions for improved training and education of servicemen.

The Czechoslovak Army Command does not believe that the newly established rights and freedoms of servicemen, including the freedom of religion and the amendment of draft regulations applicable to people traveling abroad or emigrating, will adversely affect the country's defense capability or the combat readiness of its armed forces.

This also applies to a certain extent to the introduction of community service as an alternative to military service. Looking at this from the angle of traditional views, this could be described as a violation of the principle of universal military conscription. However, the interest displayed in community service does not bear out these fears.

[Shapovalov] In any transformations, apart from positive aspects, there are also drawbacks. What are the latter in respect of the army reform?

[Vacek] Naturally, every change is connected with problems. However, that is a natural law of human conduct and experience, a manifestation of the law of action and reaction, as it were, in social conditions. They stem above all from subjective approaches to military issues. Our aim is to define the limits permissible in free debate. Naturally, the limiting factor in defining this framework is the necessity to maintain the army's combat readiness.

[Shapovalov] What is your vision of the Czechoslovak Army of the future?

[Vacek] Its development will depend directly on the continuation of the all-European peace process and will take place in accordance with the Czechoslovak military doctrine so as to ensure the sovereignty and independence of the state on the basis of the principle of defense sufficiency.

In the near future we are planning substantial cuts in the numerical strength of personnel and combat hardware.

The higher quality of the Czechoslovak Army will be achieved by means of a gradual transition to the voluntary principle of manning, and in the technical sphere by means of modernization. In this way conditions will be created for a further probable reduction of the length of compulsory military service. In the future Czechoslovak Army we intend to strengthen the social standing of servicemen and enhance their prestige.

We want to have a considerably leaner Czechoslovak Army than at present, an army which would, however, from the viewpoint of military qualities be on a par with the armies of the European states which have taken part in the talks on the new security system.

[Shapovalov] Could you say a few words about the Czechoslovak Army and the Warsaw Pact?

[Vacek] The Warsaw Pact was founded in specific historical conditions to counterbalance another military bloc already in existence in Europe. At present Czechoslovak foreign policy advocates the need to change bloc thinking and to switch to a bloc-free collective system of European security.

Czechoslovakia intends to remain within the system of European security. Consequently, if the bloc principle is retained, it will remain a member of the Warsaw Pact. It is necessary, within the framework of the talks which are underway in the top organs of this pact, to bring the text of the statutes in line with the changes in the political systems of its member states and to boost the political activities of the bloc at the expense of the military activities. In my view, a unilateral dismantling of the Warsaw Pact while keeping NATO intact would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and put the process of further disarmament in jeopardy.

Report on Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Bohemia

*LD1005153990 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1330 GMT 10 May 90*

[Summary] The last train carrying Soviet military equipment is leaving Zamberk in eastern Bohemia. Eight Soviet units have so far left without major delays. The last soldier left the Ceska Trebova garrison Tuesday [8 May]; the equipment from Klasterec nad Orlici has been transferred to the Zamberk train station where the loading was completed today and a car to take away the soldiers is expected this afternoon. The situation with regard to damage is, of course, worse. After more than 20 years of Soviet troops' stay, damage in Ceska Trebova is estimated at Kcs24 million, while the Soviet side estimates it as less than fifty percent [of this figure], but this does not include damage to the soil, which will be specified later.

According to the Usti nad Orlici District National Committee, those who are interested in the vacated premises should view them and propose how they should be used so that the best possible effect can be obtained. Problems

are also foreseen with training ammunition, inspections of training grounds, and with the guarding of vacated premises. The requirements in this respect were cabled to the parliamentary commission. However, the Army itself should come forward and not wait for a decision by the government.

Soviet Troops To Leave Sliac 5 Oct

*LD1105205190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1630 GMT 11 May 90*

[Text] [Announcer] The mixed parliamentary commission supervising the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia held its third itinerant session in Slovakia today. Lubos Lidicky reports from Sliac:

[Lidicky] The conclusion reached by the parliamentary commission on one item on its agenda was clear: the departure of the helicopter division from Sliac. The troops will depart on 5 October, and the division's command by the end of the year. However, what is as yet not clear is the repair of the damage and its restitution. In the Central Slovak region alone, 100 cubic meters of soil have been contaminated with oil products. Thanks to the timely action by the Czechoslovak Army and specialists, curative springs in Sliac have been saved. The airport, where further products are stored, is not threatened by contamination because it rests on a heavy clay foundation.

Another problem which the commission found and which must be tackled is the state of the military installations, which are worth around one billion korunas. Moreover, 115 unauthorized buildings had been found to exist in the region, which will have to be liquidated. Out of 2,000 apartments which will be freed up following the Soviet troop departure, only several hundred will be available immediately. The situation concerning Soviet housing quarters of the [name indistinct] type, which do not come up to at all to Czechoslovak technical standards, is unclear. In the town of Zvolen, four prefabricated buildings have been given a specific designation. They are to be converted into a service center, boarding establishment, and home for pensioners.

Vacek on Positive, Negative Aspects of Warsaw Pact

*LD1305155290 Prague CTK in English 1419 GMT
13 May 90*

[Text] Prague, May 13 (CTK)—Czechoslovakia fully respects the obligations following from its membership of the Warsaw Treaty and supports the efforts for changing this organization into a political union and increasing its role in the sphere of disarmament, Czechoslovak Defense Minister Miroslav Vacek said in his order issued on the 35th anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Treaty.

He stressed that Czechoslovakia at present actively strives for the establishment of a new, flexible and

promising model of European security in which it will be able to assert its desire for cooperation and open dialogue.

The Warsaw Treaty fulfilled and has been fulfilling its mission. Its activity played a positive role in the process of easing military and political tension in Europe. The events taking place on the European continent prove that the world has so far needed such an organization, Miroslav Vacek said.

He, however, pointed out that the history of the Warsaw Treaty had also been linked with the neo-Stalinist approaches to tackling international problems and limiting the sovereignty of the member countries. The unjustified invasion by the troops of the five Warsaw Treaty member states of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the following deployment of the Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory had negative consequences for further development of the country.

Poll Reveals Public's Views on Warsaw Pact, EC *AU1505132090*

[Editorial Report] Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 14 May on page 2 carries a 400-word unattributed report on a public opinion poll, involving a representative sample of 1,598 respondents, carried out by the Sociological Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences on 16-19 April. The LIDOVE NOVINY report includes a passage on the respondents' views on foreign political issues. This passage states that only 16 percent of those polled advocated Czechoslovakia's continued membership in the Warsaw Pact, while 5 percent said that Czechoslovakia should become a member of NATO, 66 percent expressed the view that Czechoslovakia should be neutral in the future, and 13 percent were "undecided as to which concept we should adopt." According to the LIDOVE NOVINY report, the same survey also revealed that 75 percent believe that Czechoslovakia should apply for EC membership.

CSFR Prepares for Convention on Chemical Arms *LD2105230290 Prague CTK in English 1656 GMT 21 May 90*

[Text] Prague, May 21 (CTK)—Czechoslovakia does not own, produce and store in its territory any chemical weapons, it was reiterated at a consultative meeting of representatives of 20 federal and national ministries dealing with preparations of a global convention on a ban on and liquidation of chemical weapons.

It was recalled at the meeting, organized by the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, that Czechoslovakia had voiced its readiness to host in its capital, Prague, the future organization which will monitor the implementation of the convention, gather the latest scientific knowledge from the sphere and participate in the development of international cooperation in it.

Czechoslovakia will submit at the disarmament conference detailed information on the production and consumption of toxic chemicals. It was announced at the meeting just as the fact that the country is considering withdrawal of its reservations about the Geneva protocol of 1925.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Replacement of Lance Missiles in FRG Criticized *AU0805194590 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 5-6 May 90 p 2*

[Gerd Prokot commentary: "Bush's Offer"]

[Text] Only a year ago, the U.S. Administration flatly turned down FRG Foreign Minister Genscher's attempt to win support for abstaining from the modernization of the Lance nuclear missiles, which constitute a suicidal threat to the FRG. The Bush administration also rejected the Soviet desire to include missiles with a range of under 500 km in the Vienna conventional disarmament talks. After scrapping intermediate and longer-range missiles, Washington was not interested in a third zero option. Yet things changed on Thursday [3 May], when Bush announced the elimination of the short-range missiles stationed in Europe—however, without setting a date for it.

Yet this constitutes by no means a unilateral disarmament move on the part of the United States. The Pentagon only abstains from modernizing weapons for which there is no more room in Europe anyway, as U.S. defense experts found in a recent study. In addition, if the United States wants to preserve its influence in Europe, it must react to changes that are taking place on the continent and within the alliance itself. Obviously, Bush does not consider the withdrawal of aging short-range missiles as too high a price for Soviet approval of the NATO membership of a united Germany.

It seems easy to take this step, particularly since a new weapons generation is already advancing. According to informed circles, the United States plans to station modern air-to-ground missiles that can reach targets in the European part of the USSR. A first step envisages the acquisition of 450 units of these so-called standoff weapons of the SRAM-T type. These weapons are to be stationed once again primarily in the FRG. The devil Lance is to be cast out in exchange for the beelzebub SRAM-T. It would mean a new round of rearmament instead of a third zero option.

Defense Minister Eppelmann on Soviet Talks *LD1005235190 East Berlin Domestic Service in German 2030 GMT 10 May 90*

[Report on interview with Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann by reporter Christian Neef; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann today [10 May] ended his visit to the Soviet

Union. [passage omitted] The future of the Warsaw Pact, the future status of Germany, the role of the Soviet forces in the GDR, and other questions were important points that our reporter, Christian Neef, discussed in an interview with Minister Eppelmann.

[Begin recording] [Neef] [passage omitted] In Gorbachev's speech on Victory Day—you were a guest at the Bolshoi Theater—he spoke very extensively about the German problem. Talk of unacceptable membership in NATO was not at the fore; instead it was firm security guarantees in a future peace treaty. Have your interlocutors here in Moscow made it clearer over the past few days what they understand in detail about these guarantees?

[Eppelmann] The Soviet Union has great interest—I can say this looking back on the past two days—in never again getting into a situation like the one it experienced from 1941 to 1945. We all know that the Soviet Union is still suffering the consequences of that war today. For this reason, I have great understanding for the security interests and fears of the Soviet Union. I believe we would do well to take them seriously; at least on this point, two-plus-four means for me the GDR on the Soviet Union's side.

[Neef] Or do you probably have the feeling that things have been overlooked concerning German-German unification and their own concepts on this? Did you also feel this?

[Eppelmann] I think that something like this is an assumption. Those responsible in the Soviet Union are torn, like many people in Europe at the moment, as well as in the GDR. They are torn between what they are experiencing, at the moment, by the political changes in our country. The statement announces that the Soviet Union will not interfere in intra-German affairs. That is one position. The other is that they ascertain that much of what is happening in the GDR and the FRG and central Europe, cautiously expressed, does not exactly accommodate the Soviet Union's security interests. They want to stick to the first position and not interfere in intra-German affairs, but they are not masochists who say that they are totally indifferent as to what comes out of it for them in the end. I believe the situation is enormously more complicated, because I am completely excluding the issues affecting the future of the Warsaw Pact. I think this alliance is in the process of disbanding, and I am also excluding how the internal developments in the Soviet Union itself continue.

[Neef] As we are talking about the Warsaw Pact, you are proposing, for example, letting the NVA [National People's Army] continue to exist as a second German Army without integrating it into any alliance system. How was this proposal received here?

[Eppelmann] Yes, I had the opportunity to explain this rather extensively to Mr. Moiseyev and Mr. Falin. In the case of Mr. Moiseyev, I had the impression [words indistinct], mainly that he listened openly and in an interested manner, in no way rejecting, giving me the

hope that in the meantime no one in the Soviet Army is not prepared at least to think about such a construction and to ask himself what it means. In the talks with Falin [words indistinct] which were somewhat longer than 20 minutes, Falin again tried to make it clear that in his opinion the key might lie in a military reduction of the two German states and in the status of a united Germany, so that it is weapon-free.

[Neef] You said immediately after the meeting with Chief of Staff Moiseyev that this was a very specific round of talks. In what way was it specific? Was it a matter of such modalities as, for example, the later withdrawal, the Soviet troop withdrawal, from the territory of the GDR, or security problems of the Western group? Can you be more specific about this?

[Eppelmann] I tried to make it clear to the chief of staff in what a complicated situation those bearing political responsibility in the GDR currently find themselves. First, they have the soldiers. At least 80 percent of GDR citizens are in favor of German unity, and simultaneously more than 90 percent are apparently in favor of a market economy, (as was always suspected). That means being linked with the West. If CEMA and the Warsaw Pact still exist in the foreseeable future, they will be without a united German republic. I put it like that to Mr. Moiseyev, and I also told him that I might be hurting him. However, I think friends should be honest with one another and not lie to each other.

My impression is, as has become clear since Bonn, that the Soviet Union has understood, right up to the political leadership, that it cannot prolong the process of German unification, or it would contribute to a process of destabilization in Central Europe, because then the flood of those GDR citizens who leave the territory of the GDR and go to Cologne, or Frankfurt am Main, or Hamburg would increase massively again, with the result that we must live with the idea that German and European unity cannot be set at a certain point in time and that we must find an interim solution which links all the motives and intentions I cited—and that might not be all of them—so that all those who have interests and fears can live with it.

I would like to return to the issue of the cost of stationing the Western Group. This subject played a role twice. [passage omitted on Eppelmann reiterating offers by the FRG to help pay for the costs of stationing the Western Group] Secondly, what is the relationship like between the Western Group and the Germans in the area, the former GDR. Here both parties started from the assumption that in the interim period, of which I have already spoken, where there will be German unity, but not yet European unity, because there is no European security system, there will presumably be allied troops on German soil—Englishmen, Americans, Frenchmen, and Soviets. Such a stationing, and such a voluntary renunciation of sovereignty on the part of FRG will only be tolerable if the relationship between the Western Group and the Germans in the GDR is a good and friendly one.

[Neef] What is the situation concerning the previously comprehensive training of GDR officers here in Moscow? I assume that it too will be reduced.

[Eppelmann] In this area, nothing at all has been changed. I think this will be one of the subjects of discussion at the beginning of June, when it will be a matter of the future of the Warsaw Pact, when the alliance's defense ministers meet in Berlin. [passage omitted on expanded agenda, and Eppelmann being the only civilian Warsaw Pact defense minister. He thinks that after the elections in East Europe, he will not be the only one]

[Neef] You have spoken much of solidarity with Gorbachev before now, and solidarity with Soviet perestroika. This particularly affects the Army, the Soviet Army, which is having difficulties following the political changes, and which has to compensate for social hardships, particularly in view of the coming troop reductions. Has the military pointed to the great difficulties disarmament and troop reductions are causing them and how we could, on our part too, accommodate the Soviet Union?

[Eppelmann] I can understand your question as I see the problems in the same way you do. There was talk of problems in talks with Moiseyev and Falin, as well as 10 days ago with the marshal of the Soviet Union, Yazov. [passage omitted recapping offer by the FRG to pay for rehousing Soviet officers in the Soviet Union, which Eppelmann conveyed to Yazov, and why Eppelmann laid flowers on Khrushchev's grave] [end recording]

Eppelmann: June Pact Meeting Agenda Expanded

LD1005200290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2006 GMT 10 May 90

[Excerpt] Moscow (ADN)—The defense ministers of the Warsaw Pact states will deviate from the original plan and discuss an expanded agenda at their meeting in Berlin in June. As Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann announced to ADN, they are thereby following a suggestion by the GDR, aimed at accounting for the new situation which arose in East Europe more than six months ago. In talks held with his counterparts from the Pact states, during his visit to the USSR—which ended today [10 May]—and which was chaired by Army General Petr Lushev, commander in chief of the Combined Forces and first deputy defense minister of the USSR, agreement was achieved that in all areas, including the future of the alliance, it would be a matter of taking into account the imminent German unification.

In further talks with Army Gen Lushev, Eppelmann expressed his opinion that there exists a whole series of common interests among members of the Warsaw Pact. He considers a joint approach to the countries of West Europe, with whom Eppelmann sees a growing affinity among alliance members, favorable. Apart from this, he

put forward the idea of using the Berlin ministers conference to give a signal in the direction of cooperation with NATO, as many countries already have bilateral contacts between politicians and the military from both pact systems. [passage omitted]

Wieczorek on Desire To Disengage From Pact

LD1105180890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1503 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Paris (ADN)—The GDR wants to reduce its obligations in the Warsaw Pact Treaty and progressively free itself from the treaty commitments. This was stated by Dr. Bertram Wieczorek, parliamentary state secretary in the GDR Disarmament and Defense Ministry, in Paris today [11 May] at NATO's spring meeting. These measures would affect supplies of arms, training, air defense and the entire command system. Wieczorek did not give a timetable for these measures.

He emphasized to some 200 NATO representatives and observers from East Europe, who were taking part for the first time, that the FRG Government has stated its agreement not to station any NATO troops on present GDR territory after unification. Here the security interests of the Soviet Union and other East European states must be taken into consideration. The National People's Army should, however, continue to exist with a purely defensive orientation and belong to no military alliance during a transitional period. Wieczorek called for a pan-European security system and stressed the need to eliminate the Iron Curtain in the minds of the population and of the military.

Eppelmann Says Warsaw Pact 'Breaking Up'

LD1405150290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1434 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—It now looks as if the Warsaw Pact is in the process of breaking up. This was stated by Defense and Disarmament Minister Rainer Eppelmann today [14 May] on the sidelines of the festive event marking the 35th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact in Strausberg. The pact's politico-military future would depend on the meeting of the disarmament and defense ministers on 7 June.

Eppelmann stressed that in his recent talks in Moscow, on the occasion of Victory Day, he had said it could be ruled out "that a Republic of Germany will belong to CEMA or the Warsaw Pact." He was deeply convinced that the future would be an all-European one.

According to Eppelmann, it looks as if the Warsaw Pact is going to break apart. "The Hungarians have signaled that they intend to leave the Pact. The Czechs wish to stagnate the alliance, and the Poles have made their position quite clear. As far as the Germans are concerned, one will have to wait and see—it depends not least on the two-plus-four negotiations." Eppelmann sees the need to keep the Warsaw Pact as a political alliance

"at least for a transitional period." There are plenty of common interests among East-Central European countries, including the Soviet Union, in the negotiations with West European states. It is not to be expected, the minister said, "that all the Central and East European countries can join an East European association at the same time."

HUNGARY

Ambassador Meiszter on Vienna Disarmament Talks

*AU1005160390 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 5 May 90 p 7*

[Interview with David Meiszter, Hungary's ambassador at the Vienna disarmament talks, by Peter Vajda; place and date not given: "When the Hungarian Proposal in Vienna Differed From the Soviet One—Interview With Ambassador David Meiszter on Limitations of Bloc Views"]

[Excerpts] [Vajda] The statements and declarations published after the sixth round of the Vienna talks that concluded last year were not too optimistic, although previously it seemed there was hope for the clearer emergence of an agreement on the reduction of conventional Armed Forces.

[Meiszter] Indeed, even before the fifth round, there were opinions that a breakthrough should be achieved by all means if we wanted to preserve the planned pace of negotiations. [passage omitted]

[Vajda] Obviously, it is alarming that negotiations are not advancing at the desired pace....

[Meiszter] The United States rang the alarm bells prior to the sixth round of talks that began on 14 March, by saying that we have to work out a 400-page document, and so far only eight pages are ready. We still have to decide on some 100 serious issues. In this way, they wanted to express their justified concern and encourage the conference to make new efforts.

[Vajda] Is this really the essence of the problem?

[Meiszter] We see it differently. The problem does not lie in the fact that the negotiations have been extended in time, but in the fact that, concerning the essence of their approach, the negotiations are lagging behind the radical changes that have taken place in Central-East Europe. According to the concept of the negotiations, an agreement must be reached between two confronting blocs having internal discipline. [passage omitted]

The changes in Europe have undermined the previous basis of these negotiations. First of all, we can no longer talk about two confronting alliances because confrontation has essentially ceased to exist. Second, we can no longer talk about two alliances having internal discipline

either; at most, we can talk about one. Third, one cannot think only in terms of alliance obligations because the implementation of agreements could be problematic when changes are taking place in that alliance itself. In our view, these are the main problems, and not the lack of time. [passage omitted]

[Vajda] Our discussion also confirms that previous impression, that a lot depends today on the attitude of the Soviet Union. In your view, what is the essence of the dilemma confronting the Soviet Union in connection with these negotiations?

[Meiszter] The essence is that now they have to reduce their Armed Forces radically, and the other side does not have to. When this causes them difficulties, they do not even realize why they have reached such a high level in developing some armaments in their arsenal. In addition, they do not see clearly enough that making "sacrifices" could represent the beginning of a period characterized by equal reductions of arms. If they are willing to take these steps, they can contribute to laying the foundations of a new security system, which would no longer focus on the military element. [passage omitted]

Deputy Vasarhelyi Proposes Quitting Warsaw Pact

National Assembly Speech

*LD0905091290 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0815 GMT 9 May 90*

[Speech by Deputy Miklos Vasarhelyi of the Alliance of Free Democrats at National Assembly session—live relay]

[Text] Mr Chairman, esteemed National Assembly. The parliamentary group of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] has submitted a draft resolution to the National Assembly speaker with the request that this draft resolution be handed over to the House's foreign affairs committee for discussion, and that it then be put forward to the plenum of the National Assembly.

We ask, regarding the nature of the issue, that this issue and its discussion be declared as urgent. Esteemed House of Deputies, allow me to indicate briefly, in a few words, what our proposal contains.

It is known that on 1 November 1956, Hungary's revolutionary government gave notice of withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, with immediate effect. Subsequent events, the Soviet military intervention, prevented the government from realizing its goal and—what was also the intention of government—from sending the designated delegation to hold talks on this issue with the various member states of the Warsaw Pact, primarily with the Soviet Union.

Our proposal is that the current National Assembly should decide on the government statement of 1 November 1956, and should act on the consequences

thereof. For this reason, we propose that the National Assembly ask the Government of the Republic of Hungary, on the basis of the above, to declare its intention to terminate [felmondani] Hungary's participation in the Warsaw Pact.

It also asks the Government of the Republic of Hungary to begin talks with the governments of the states belonging to the Warsaw Pact on reinstating the legitimate situation—that is, the situation of 1 November 1956—and to begin talks, in the interest of finding a solution agreeable to the Soviet Union, so that Hungary should no longer be a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Until the National Assembly asks the Government of the Republic of Hungary to act along these terms, we propose that it terminate Hungary's participation in the Warsaw Pact's military organization.

This is not an extraordinary request; for example, France has been a member of NATO for many years without taking part in its military organization.

We further request that we re-examine the so-called friendship and mutual assistance treaties with the Warsaw Pact's member states, which came about in the framework of this Pact, and that everything that provides an opportunity for military intervention or otherwise violates our country's sovereignty should be deleted from the treaties. At the same time, there ought to be efforts to ensure that suitable provisions on the protection of minorities are included in the bilateral friendship treaties.

In conclusion, our draft resolution declares that Hungary does not wish to belong to or join any bloc, and that the territory of Hungary will not be put at the disposal of anyone for the purpose of attacks or threats against a third state.

Finally, Hungary will do its utmost in the interest of creating an all-European security system, and it will coordinate these endeavours with the member states of the Warsaw Pact. Thank you. [tumultuous applause]

Further on Warsaw Pact Issue

*LD0905104790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1000 GMT 9 May 90*

[Text] We go over to parliament where the parliamentary group of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] held a news conference during the recess. Peter Szorenyi reports:

[Begin Szorenyi recording] The step would not provoke the Soviet Union, strategically we are a negligible country, said Miklos Vasarhelyi at the news conference. The subject of the news conference was the draft resolution, whose essence is that our country should commence negotiations on withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact. Miklos Vasarhelyi also thought it important to note that we do not, according to the resolution, wish to join NATO.

Replying to questions, they said that this was an independent initiative from the SZDSZ. They did not coordinate with other parties, thus they do not know whose support they can count on when the proposal is debated by the National Assembly at its next session. The plan of the SZDSZ experts is that, to begin with, we would not participate in Warsaw Pact military cooperation. The essence of this is that there would be no joint military exercises in our country, and we would not participate in military exercises abroad with Pact member states' troops. Also, the direction of the Hungarian Army would not belong under the auspices of the joint command. Miklos Vasarhelyi also denied any connection between 9 May, Victory Day, and the announcement; it is completely accidental. This is when parliament is holding session.

Peter Tolgyessy also took part in the news conference. In reply to a question on whether they had coordinated internationally on this question, he said they had not. He added that the people of Germany had not coordinated with the superpowers when they had decided in favor of union either. This much in a nutshell from the parliament. [end recording]

Horn Uncertain About Proposed Pact Withdrawal

*LD0905181590 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1630 GMT 9 May 90*

[Excerpts] The proposal that was made out of turn by Miklos Vasarhelyi on behalf of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] surprised the various parliamentary parties. What he asked was that the National Assembly pass a resolution on restoring the situation of 1 November 1956, when the government renounced its membership in the Warsaw Pact, and that, until parliament makes a decision on this issue, Hungary suspend its membership in the Warsaw Pact. Jozsef Laszlo has asked members of various parliamentary factions for their opinions on this. [passage omitted] Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gyula Horn formulated his opinion in a somewhat annoyed way.

[Begin Horn recording] For a country like Hungary, adherence to an alliance system is one of the vital issues. I am not certain that we should alter our relations with the Warsaw Pact radically in such a way that it would represent a break (?all at once), because in fact the consequences of this step have to be weighed. First and foremost, I am thinking about what effect this will have on relations with the other member states, and above all on our relations with the Soviet Union. I would like to add—and it is common knowledge—that at the time of the takeover of power in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the new leadership in both countries hastened to assert that they do not question their countries' adherence to the Warsaw Pact.

The other thing is that the Warsaw Pact is in a process of transformation, clearly, since everywhere a turnaround is under way. I agree with the arguments that Hungary's security is not threatened, that there is no danger of

attack—in other words, from the West. But, at the same time, it is also (?worthy of) attention that fairly serious tensions have developed around our country.

The next point is that because a sort of European—and what is more, more broadly, an international—balance of power is built on the relations of the two blocs one to the other, it is by no means a matter of indifference for us what will happen with this balance of power if one of the member states leaves, what (?disadvantage) this would have within the organization. It could launch a chain reaction. It could speed up the dissolution of the entire alliance system.

And then there is one other viewpoint: That apart from Soviet-Hungarian relations—because in fact we also have to keep in view what effect this will have on the present-day Soviet leadership [word indistinct] within its own country—(?what interests me is) how to assert national interests, how to take international realities into consideration. [passage omitted on other faction members' opinions]

Defense Spokesman on USSR Troop Withdrawals

*LD0905221290 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1805 GMT 9 May 90*

[Report on interview with Defense Ministry Spokesman Gyorgy Keleti by Peter Marvanyi; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] Finally, we have an interview with Colonel Gyorgy Keleti. Peter Marvanyi asked the Defense Ministry spokesman about the pace of the Soviet troop withdrawal and the justification of the Soviet objections. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Marvanyi] Recently Colonel General Burlakov stated that it is not certain that the schedule (of the withdrawal) can be kept. It is not certain that the final deadline can be kept.

[Keleti] I am surprised at General Burlakov's statement to PRAVDA, because some two weeks ago we sat together in the office of the Hungarian defense minister, and at that time Ferenc Karpati asked whether he [Burlakov] could see any obstructing factor, and General Burlakov decidedly stated no; the troop withdrawal can be fulfilled; the pace can be maintained. [passage omitted]

[Marvanyi] According to Burlakov, the reason why the Soviet military installations in Hungary have got into such a terribly bad state—which actually is proved by recently published photographs as well—is because when the Soviet troops withdrew from them, the Hungarian troops did not take over guard duty at these installations.

[Keleti] This claim of the commander of the Southern Army Group relates to those barracks and installations which the Soviets left last year. At that time the Hungarian Army assumed the guard of all the barracks.

Unfortunately, we also have experiences showing that this guard was not always on top of its task. Alternatively, it happened that unauthorized persons penetrated the barracks. I would still say that this is the exception rather than the rule, and these are not the reasons why the Soviet barracks are not in the best of condition. [passage omitted]

[Marvanyi] According to the Soviet side, the pace of the troop withdrawals and the economic agreements could also be impeded by the fact that the Hungarian side, according to certain interpretations, is not trying intensively enough to sell off the vacated installations.

[Keleti] I do not think that it is the Soviet's task to concern themselves with the sale and subsequent use of the vacated installations. Their task is to leave these installations in accordance with what is laid down in the agreement....

[Marvanyi, interrupting] Yes, but they say that the money coming in by this channel could be the basis for their accommodating in the Soviet Union the soldiers and the families who are leaving Hungary. Here it is a question of over 10,000 people who have no housing.

[Keleti] Again, I do not consider this an internal affair of the Hungarian Republic. It is the task of the Soviet Government and the leadership of the Soviet Army to resolve these issues. I believe that the account can only be settled after the complete withdrawal and the bit-by-bit accounting, which the Soviet experts propose and which the Soviet Government Commissioner is also fighting for, can not be carried out. [end recording]

Hungary's Warsaw Pact Membership Analyzed

*AU1505161790 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 10 May 90 p 3*

[Peter Vajda editorial: "Doing Away With the Pact?"]

[Text] The proposal made by the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] in parliament on 9 May has justifiably caused a great sensation: Budapest should initiate negotiations—primarily with Moscow—leading to the elimination of Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact. Obviously, the parliament will decide on the matter after a debate; here and now, we want to describe certain aspects of this matter, and this could contribute to the decision.

As created, prolonged, and operated to date, the Warsaw Pact has lost its justification. The ideological power that held this Pact together has ceased to exist, and the distorted, threatening image (NATO and German revanchism), which served as a justification for the creation and operation of the Warsaw Pact, has also ceased to exist. The old Warsaw Pact simply does not exist any longer. The old bloc competition of power has essentially lost its importance in Europe. Therefore, it is useless to

talk about a coalition doctrine and a coalition strategy. If this is true, the question arises: Is it worth suing a dead wife for divorce?

The fact that the Warsaw Pact is a framework of important disarmament talks can also be added here as a factor for slower progress. Compared with its population, Hungary has been doing a lot for the success of the disarmament talks. If we bow out, and others follow our example, what will happen to the negotiations?

There is also another factor calling for caution. It is hardly a wise thing to risk our own national interests; national interests outline our priorities. The need to conclude the full withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary is definitely one of our national interests. A regression in Moscow could also disturb this process; one cannot be sure that anti-Gorbachev forces would not make use of a total disintegration of the Warsaw Pact in order to compromise the Soviet president. Even today, there are conservative forces who are ringing the alarm bells in the Kremlin: Who lost East Europe?

All these things are not counterarguments against the SZDSZ proposal, because one cannot pretend that the dead are alive. The dead must be buried. All these things mentioned above are only caution: We must very thoroughly consider the timing of our actions, also taking into consideration that, for some time, there has been no Soviet dominance in the Warsaw Pact, and membership in this alliance did not block the changes in the regimes or the independent road of the Hungarian foreign policy. The fact that every country is now busy with its own internal affairs could also affect the timing.

According to the signs, two things can be done until the time for withdrawal. First, we must politically analyze whether the Warsaw Pact is able to reorganize into an efficient body. This has been the official political trend so far, and only the future will tell whether this can be implemented. (Can we regard as even a "consultative ally" a state which does not guarantee fundamental human rights for Hungarians living there?) Second, we must ensure as soon as possible that the Hungarian Armed Forces are clearly and exclusively subordinated to the Hungarian nation. This (as well as refraining from unnecessary and expensive joint military maneuvers) do not necessarily go along with formal declarations which might sever certain ties....

After all, in matters of doing away with the Warsaw Pact, timing is almost more essential than the method, and here and now, we ourselves are at stake, rather than our future.

Defense Ministry Report on Soviet Withdrawals

*LD1105224690 Budapest MTI in English
1942 GMT 11 May 90*

[Text] Budapest, May 11 (MTI)—By May 11, 67 Soviet troops trains, 57 provisions trains, as well as 12 container and three passenger trains had left Hungary—MTI

was informed at the Defence Ministry Press and Information Department on the basis of a daily report submitted to Government Commissioner Brigadier General Antal Annus.

The withdrawal has so far involved more than 5,000 soldiers, 1,400 technical devices and 58,000 tonnes of material.

The pullout of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary began on March 12 under an inter-governmental agreement, and is going on as planned.

MDF's Jeszensky on Warsaw Pact, Germany

*LD1205223390 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1400 GMT 12 May 90*

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Geza Jeszenszky is the surest bet for the head of the Foreign Ministry. Our staff member Jozsef Paszto conducted an interview with him.

[Begin recording] [Paszto] This week I believe that a great stir was created, not only in Hungarian domestic politics, but in European politics as well, by the Alliance of Free Democrats' [SZDSZ] proposal that Parliament should decide whether Hungary should suspend and then terminate its membership in the Warsaw Pact. The papers in this connection quoted you in banner headlines: This proposal was badly timed. How do you justify this?

[Jeszenszky] In issues of great importance one has to pursue a common foreign policy—or at least, one has to strive for this. We already indicated after our election victory that we will strive to pursue a multiparty foreign policy. Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee is called upon to guarantee this. Therefore, just as the government and the government party are willing to do this, I think that there must a readiness for this also on the part of the opposition. Therefore, the loyal thing would have been—for they have asserted that they wish to be a loyal opposition—if they had at least come to us, asked us what we thought about it. This proposal is an issue that definitely requires, on the one hand, domestic political consultation, but beyond this, foreign political consultations as well. I think that responsible politics means precisely that we do not politicize for the public, nor for the press, but that we want to attain something.

[Paszto] Didn't you want to propose this? In other words, didn't it figure in the MDF's [Hungarian Democratic Forum] foreign political concepts that Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact?

[Jeszenszky] The expression "neutrality" figures in the foreign political programme of the MDF, just as it does in the foreign political programme of the SZDSZ. There figures the demand that the Warsaw Pact be dissolved, abolished with a common agreement. In this, too, the two standpoints are virtually the same. So, as a matter of fact, we wished to proceed in harmony with our program, in which there figured precisely the steps I have

just outlined. Here the Free Democrats did something else. [passage omitted on general remarks about changing Hungarian foreign policy]

[Paszto] I think that the new, united Germany will be a determining European power of the coming period. On the other hand, from another point of view, one could say that Central Europe, Central East Europe, will again come between two big powers: basically between the Soviet Union and Germany. In your view how can this dilemma be resolved? Or rather, need there be fears that old situations, old reflexes, old conflicts, will return here?

[Jerszenszky] Well, I am a historian, and perhaps also in this capacity I can say that history knows similar or analogous situations, but it never really repeats itself. Therefore, I could say also on this kind of philosophical basis that there is no threat of this, and I do not believe that we could return either to the pre-World War I power political formulae, or to the situation between the two world wars, which many people are afraid of. The present Germany will not be the same as any of the earlier German empires, not only because it is different territorially, and that it is a country with an unequivocally, indisputably, democratic system, but also because it has already renounced a significant part of its sovereignty; it is part of the European community. We value the sympathy which Germany shows toward us, its (?proven) gratitude, and we also wish to build on this. We would also like to enlarge our economic relations. [passage omitted]

[Paszto] Let us then look at the other big power, which, even putting it mildly, is in fair trouble. It is losing its winnings, and it is losing its influence, or its zone of influence. I could say, putting it very simply, that the one who dissolves the empire is always out of favor in the eyes of posterity. What is your opinion on this?

[Jerszenszky] As for what will happen in the Soviet Union, no one can say that today. A small power, a small country—especially one that is a neighbor to the Soviet Union—has to play safe, or at least it must not hazard anything. On the one hand it is a correctly held interest of Hungary—and apart from that, the world also expects it of her—to politicize carefully, soberly, in connection with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is not a paper tiger. And the question of what condition it is in and, let us say, what amputations are necessary in order that this man [the Soviet Union], who might perhaps be described as sick, should stay alive or even become healthy; that is something we cannot know today. We cannot undertake responsibility for perhaps also having contributed to something, something whose consequences are incalculable and could even be very grave.

It has to be taken into consideration what the alternatives are in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev continues to be the number one man, whose staying in power, whose policy's success, is in the elemental interests of Hungary, to, and of other countries, as well. [passage omitted:

Announcer says that the literary historian Endre Bojtár, a Hungarian expert on Baltic culture, has received a message from Landsbergis asking that Hungary support the declaration of Lithuania's independence. Endre Bojtár expands on this request. At the end of the interview Jerszenszky is asked for his opinion about this. He says in essence that Hungary is not in a situation where it could take such a step by itself] [end recording]

SZDSZ Official on Pact Withdrawal Proposal

*AU1605123690 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 14 May 90 p 5*

[Report on interview with Imre Mecs, Alliance of Free Democrats parliamentary deputy, by reporter "K.J.T."; place and date not given: "Imre Mecs on Withdrawal From the Warsaw Pact—The Intentions of the Free Democrats Were Known"]

[Text] Istvan Szucs, commissioner of the National Presidium of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], called the proposal of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] to hold negotiations on withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and to immediately halt our membership in this military organization as a hasty and careless proposal. According to Szucs, the SZDSZ would like to cause difficulties for the new government and simultaneously improve their own positions. At the same time, it is not the responsibility of the SZDSZ to implement this, and, with this proposal, the SZDSZ has, in fact, "placed a mine on the road of the new government."

[NEPSZABADSAG] What is your opinion about this?

[Mecs] We do not regard our proposal as hasty at all. We have been calling for Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact for a long time. We even included this fundamental goal in our declaration of principles. Thus, our intentions were clearly known by everyone.... At the same time, we continue to stress that we are striving for a consensus at the talks to be held on Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. We think that our intentions and proposals do not "overburden" our relations with the member countries and the Soviet Union. We are convinced that it is more correct to strive for honest and correct political, economic and cultural relations, rather than rely on dubious agreements. The withdrawal statement of the Imre Nagy government in 1956 represents the starting point of our proposal. The Imre Nagy government, which the communists and the Hungarian laws recognized as legitimate, was also legitimate in the eyes of the people.

[NEPSZABADSAG] According to the MDF, however, your proposal only makes it more difficult for the new government to act....

[Mecs] This is wrong. We have given numerous examples which show that, in certain issues, we indeed want to help the activity of parliament and of the government. However, we think that there are matters that are beyond

party interests. Our proposal can definitely not be considered to be a "mine." Our proposal, the essence of which is to start negotiations as soon as possible, provides a considerable scope of maneuver for the government. Besides, we also informed Soviet Ambassador Boris Stukalin about all this on the very day when we made the proposal in parliament. We told Boris Stukalin that our proposals had no anti-Soviet aspect whatsoever. Boris Stukalin listened to us carefully and regarded our information as correct.

More on Withdrawal of Soviet Air Regiment

LD1805165890 Budapest MTI in English 1353 GMT 18 May 90

[Text] Budapest, May 18 (MTI)—Planes of the Soviet Air Wing stationed at Debrecen Air Base left on Friday for good, bringing the airport's military function to a close.

At the gathering held to mark the occasion, Brigadier General Ivan Mikulin, political head of Group of the Soviet Southern Army Group and political deputy to the commander, delivered a farewell address in the presence of military attaches accredited to Budapest.

On behalf of the population, Ferenc Debreczeni, deputy chairman of the local council, spoke to the departing soldiers, wishing them a good trip back and stressing that the local community would remember them as good friends.

The ceremony over, 39 Mig 23s and Mig 27s took off for their new base.

According to MTI sources, the former Debrecen airborne regiment will become part of the Soviet Navy and be stationed near Murmansk.

Information to MTI sources, the former Debrecen airborne regiment will become part of the Soviet Navy and be stationed near Murmansk.

Information obtained from the Ministry of Defence says that the Soviet troops pull-out is going ahead according to schedule.

Altogether, 154 railway carriages of soldiers have left the country so far.

Brigadier General Antal Annus, deputy chief of staff of the Hungarian Army, confirmed that May 25 would be the date of the complete takeover of Debrecen Air Base.

The Hungarian Army, however, cannot undertake to guard all six thousand facilities to be taken over.

This task should be taken over from the Army by the institute for handling and utilizing frozen state assets as soon as possible, said the brigadier general.

After the departure of the air regiment, the military attaches present left for Mandok to view for themselves the loading of departing Soviet units.

Lukacs Szabo, MP, member of the Debrecen Presidium of the HDF, announced that the airport would be turned into the central venue for events held to mark children's day next weekend.

Foreign Affairs Committee Discusses Pact Withdrawal

LD2905113890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 29 May 90

[Report from closed session of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee by Correspondent Peter Zentai]

[Text] The subject is sensitive, I propose that we hold a closed meeting, said Gyula Horn, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, accompanied by rapid nods from MP's from the government coalition and the Socialist Party. This had decided the fate of the reporters, so I am now talking to you from one of the corridors of parliament, but not without something to report. During the break, I have learned the following.

Lieutenant General Kalman Loerincz, chief of staff of the Forces, tried to convince the Foreign Affairs Committee of the disadvantages for Hungary that could follow from an immediate, unilateral departure from the Warsaw Pact. The lieutenant general was said not to be influenced by the fact that those who are suggesting departure from the Pact are proposing first of all the beginning of negotiations. This was outlined with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, given abroad and published in today's NEPSZABADSAG. In spite of all this, Kalman Loerincz was only stressing the dangers: if we leave the Pact, there will be no armaments, and no replacement of spare parts for the Hungarian Army. What we must therefore try to achieve is the change of the Warsaw Pact from a military to a political organization.

The MP's have heard, it was said to be for the first time, that according to a protocol which is to expire at the end of this year, in the case of extraordinary circumstances [as heard] Hungary is compelled to place 100,000 soldiers under the direct command of the central command of the Warsaw Pact, so 100,000 Hungarian soldiers are to obey mainly Soviet commanders.

Behind closed doors, the committee is at present awaiting to learn what the Warsaw Pact command and Moscow regard as extraordinary circumstances.

POLAND

Soviet Troop Presence in Country Viewed

AU1405091890 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8 May 90 pp 1, 7

[Maria Wagrowska article: "Soviet Troops in Poland—Facts and Questions"]

[Text] During the last six months, more has been written and said about Soviet forces stationed in Poland than

was said during the whole of the postwar period. The issue has ceased to be shrouded in mystery. Many bitter words have been said about the way Soviet forces abuse their status as guests. There are contradictory arguments on this whole issue. While some people call for a rapid withdrawal of these forces, others want them to stay for a little while longer. Nevertheless, many issues linked to the stationing and the role of Soviet troops stationed in Poland and Europe still remain to be decided.

Will the promised amendment of the legislation that governs the stationing of Soviet forces in Poland be acceptable to the interests of the Polish state if it becomes apparent that these forces are to stay for a much longer period? The legal basis for the stationing of Soviet troops on Polish territory is governed by a treaty of 17 December 1956 between the government of the Polish People's Republic and the government of the USSR, and by some 31 legally binding regulations that apply to specific issues.

The treaty, which reflects the spirit of October 1956, does not of itself give rise to any legal or formal doubts. Article 1 of the treaty states that "the temporary stationing of Soviet military units in Poland must not undermine the sovereignty of the Polish state and it must not lead to interference in the internal affairs of the Polish People's Republic." Any troop movements, new construction projects, installation of communications, and so on, beyond the areas of stationing require the approval of the Polish authorities on each such occasion. Soviet soldiers and their families are required to observe and respect the provisions of Polish law. If they breach Polish law, the Polish military prosecutor and the Polish military courts have jurisdiction, with the exception of breaches that occur during the performance of military duties.

However, the practice has evolved where the Polish prosecutor only carries out the investigations, further action is left to the discretion of the Soviet authorities. Experts claim that this must change. Polish jurisdiction must not be excluded from the process of ensuring that Polish justice is carried out. Changes in the prosecutor service, the nascent local government, and a new consciousness of a citizens' society are all factors that ought to influence the change of current practice.

Lawyers claim that the regulations on the use of buildings, infrastructure, land, and other services by Soviet forces must be completely amended. To date, the Soviet Union has only reimbursed some 50 percent. A commission of Polish experts has been working on a draft of new regulations since last December. It has recommended that the principle whereby Soviet forces are accorded the same privileges that are enjoyed by the Polish Armed Forces should be abandoned. The Polish Army does not enjoy any special rights when it participates in maneuvers on Soviet training grounds. Given the favorable response from the Soviet side, one is hopeful that the agreements stipulating full reimbursements will be negotiated sometime around the beginning of next year.

Regardless of the ultimate content of these agreements, what will be crucial is the way Polish authorities, Polish jurisdiction, and local government authorities will seek to ensure compliance with the letter of the law and the principles of good coexistence.

Another issue stems from the problems caused by military aircraft. The noise is a nuisance suffered by the inhabitants of many affected localities, especially Brzeg and Szprotawa, but also Kluczbork, Piotrkow, Czestochowa, and Radom. It is sufficient to mention that the airfield near Brzeg is only some one-and-a-half kilometers away from the city center and the airfield near Szprotawa four-and-a-half kilometers away. In Szprotawa, however, the city center is in the direct line of the takeoff runway. The 28 February 1990 prohibition on MiG-25 supersonic nighttime flights over Brzeg only partially resolves the problem. During the recent visit of General Dimitriy Yazov, Soviet minister of defense, it was agreed that additional units would be transferred from Brzeg, some to other airfields, and some to the Soviet Union. In time, similar arrangements will apply to Szprotawa. Torun is another place where the Soviet military presence causes a problem. The city, on account of its location, convergence of communication routes, and its industrial development in the south, can only expand northward. However, the military has some 260 hectares of land here, land that is suitable for housing development. In the coming months, this Air Force depot will be relocated elsewhere. Part of it will be relocated to the Soviet Union.

One must be cautious when talking about the total number of Soviet forces in Poland. This figure was recently was given as 58,000. The Soviet delegation taking part in the Vienna negotiations on armed forces and armaments reductions in Europe has stated that the number of Soviet forces stationed in Poland amounts to 58,400 soldiers. Why then were Polish experts only aware of 40,000 until a few weeks ago? Why did the mayor of Swidnica tell a "Panorama" reporter that Swidnica has 12,000 Soviet troops when a representative of the Soviet command stated there are only 5,000? Such discrepancies do nothing to increase one's faith in the policy of glasnost. Military secrets in the age of the spy satellite and international conferences that seek to build up measures of mutual confidence would surely not have suffered as a result of the truth being told. Nonetheless, the number of Soviet troops has never exceeded the 62,000-68,000 limit provided for in the treaty.

The Soviet Army Northern Group in Poland currently has 35 garrisons situated in 15 voivodships, mainly in northwest Poland. Only small concentrations of troops are located in the central voivodships (Rembertow, Lowicz), and their task is to protect communication lines, supplies, Army depots, and so on.

Soviet forces have 70,000 hectares of land at their disposal. Of this number, 35,000 hectares are woods, 25,000 hectares scrub land, and 563 hectares of arable land. These forces occupy 1,157 buildings (with 9,100

inhabitants), which have a total usable surface area of 451,000 square meters, 2,440 communal buildings, and 2,100 square meters of barracks (the first units that were withdrawn from Poland left behind 67 buildings with 326 dwellings).

What is the structure of the Soviet forces? Land forces have some 35,000 soldiers, the Air Force has 13,000, and the Navy has some 5,000. Even if one were to accept these numbers as corresponding to the actual state of affairs and allowed for the fact that these are in a constant state of flux, we are left with the question: What units do the remaining 5,000 troops belong to? RZECZPOSPOLITA was unable to get an answer to this question. For example, are these units chemical warfare troops? If so, do they have a defensive character, for example, specializing in radioactivity detection and decontamination of land, or do they have an offensive character? Apparently until last year there was a small battalion of chemical warfare troops stationed in Poland. Are there nuclear weapon elements stored on Polish territory?

These questions are justified from the point of view of the security of the inhabitants of the localities where such elements might be deployed, as well as from the point of view of Polish society and the Polish state. It is not only a question of the effects that storage of such elements might have, but more importantly the fact that being strategic locations these locations are potential targets for long-range attack. The security of Poland and its new defensive doctrine will depend on the answers to these questions.

The National Defense Committee at its 13 March 1990 meeting accepted the principle that given the uncertain nature of the future European defense system, the withdrawal of Soviet forces ought to be made dependent on how the international situation develops. What does this really mean?

The Soviet Army Northern Group is a uniform organism. Its main components are communications, bases, and other logistic elements. In this way, the military communication lines between the GDR and the USSR are protected. The units stationed in Poland only have the role of a logistic support for the Soviet Army Western Group. As such, they are a component of this grouping that preserves the military balance in what is still the most sensitive part of our continent.

Within the Northern Group are units that are capable of offensive operations in the European theater and, according to the experts to whom we spoke, Polish security considerations require that reserve forces capable of offensive operations are stationed for some time to come.

According to the experts, proposed reductions of the Soviet forces stationed in our country must take into account two main elements of the international scene, namely, the evolution of the German question and the

implementation of the agreement (presently being negotiated) on the reduction of conventional forces and armaments in Europe.

For as long as we continue to justify the presence of Soviet forces in the GDR (also in the eyes of the Polish *raison d'etat*), the stationing of Soviet forces on Polish territory will have justification. Given such a situation, some Polish specialists maintain that Soviet forces stationed in Poland could quickly be reduced to some 5,000 troops after a short space of time and have mainly limited logistic tasks. It would mean that units equipped with offensive (or those of more offensive than defensive capability) weapons would be withdrawn in accordance with the principle that has been accepted in the discussions between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. However, military experts are unwilling to specify a date by which all Soviet units could be withdrawn from Polish territory.

Soviet Troops Vacate Swidnica, Move to Legnica

*LD0905184990 Warsaw Television Service
in Polish 1730 GMT 9 May 90*

[Text] The residents of Swidnica will gain 1,000 apartments, vacated by the Soviet troops. In accordance with Premier Mazowiecki's decision, the headquarters of the Northern Group of Soviet troops is being moved to Legnica, for the moment. Today there are 8,000 troops and families of officers in Swidnica. After the move, only two small units will remain, and the town, in addition to the apartments, will take over the barracks, a hospital, a school, and a cultural institution.

Army Paper on Warsaw Pact's Future

*AU1705185290 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ in Polish 14 May 90 p 6*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Jerzy Markowski: "What Kind of Warsaw Pact?"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Today it is clear to everyone that there is a need for the Warsaw Pact to continue to exist if only to serve as a stable partner for the West in disarmament negotiations. Later, its political role could be confirmed in the verification of the treaties that are concluded. It should be pointed out that this view is also held by the West. Not a single call for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has been heard in NATO. In fact, it was we who on several occasions came out for the simultaneous dissolution of the two military blocs. Now that we have come to appreciate their proper role in disarmament processes, views of that kind are seldom heard. They will no doubt reappear when a new collective security system for Europe is worked out and implemented.

However, long before that, solutions will have to be found to the many military technical problems that exist in cooperation between the allied armies of the Warsaw Pact. We got a foretaste of this at the April Sejm session

devoted to foreign policy during which Minister Skubiszewski said in his expose: "The practice of combining the post of commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact with that of USSR deputy defense minister should be abandoned in favor of a rotation of all senior posts that would be based on new powers for all the member-states." In other words, a new agreement on the Warsaw Pact military command structure is essential. It also represents an important sign for improvements to the Pact mechanism, which would include achieving possible agreement on changes to the distribution of Joint Armed Forces command organs and their internal reorganization. There is no doubt that there is also a need to define the functions of the defense ministers' committee more precisely. Could the rotation of the post of commander in chief, which Minister Skubiszewski mentioned, not be extended to his deputies for naval and air forces? It definitely could. A new view and approach has to be finally adopted with respect to cooperation, which is unfortunately poorly developed, between the allied states and the production of military equipment. The mechanism for financial-currency settlements is far from perfect. Then, finally, if the treaty is to perform a positive political role in the future, is it not worth considering the possibility of establishing a permanent organ for molding the Pact's foreign policy that would be made up of civilian representatives of the member-states? I am by no means proposing NATO patterns, but NATO does have something similar that is headed by a secretary general and it appears to function rather well.

This outline of the reforms and changes that should take place if the treaty is to survive and exhibit its vitality in performing defense functions for the member states is far from perfect and of necessity brief. Changes of this kind are absolutely essential at the present time. The changes have to be genuine and not remain intentions, but be realized, because defense policy cannot be built on intentions alone, even if they are the of the very best kind. A calm and systematic approach to bringing the Warsaw Pact up to date is the Pact's only chance. For how long?—It is difficult to predict how events will unfold, but undoubtedly for as long as it has the role to perform that we discussed earlier. Contrary to appearances, pluralism with respect to interests and views provides the Warsaw Pact with new blood. If pluralism replaces the current monopolistic unity with respect to the Warsaw Pact's ideological goals and aspirations, and

there is every indication that it will, then the grave-diggers can put aside their spades all the more quickly. They will not be needed. Nevertheless, the question of what kind of pact we want has not lost any of its topicality.

ROMANIA

Neagu Addresses UN Disarmament Commission
AU1905170390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1024 GMT 19 May 90

[Text] Bucharest, 19 May (ROMPRES)—Romania is firmly attached to the target of nuclear and conventional disarmament achievable through negotiations, by an all-embracing approach and endorsement of measures in one domain without conditioning it on results in another domain of disarmament, said Romulus Neagu, deputy foreign minister, in the United Nations Disarmament Commission holding proceedings in New York.

He also stressed that Romania was for flexibility, compromise and pragmatism. As for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the Romanian representative said, this is up to the nuclear states with the constructive participation of the nonnuclear countries toward speeding up and concluding negotiations in the domain. The target of general nuclear disarmament, the speaker stressed, can however be attained only through progressive measures. Efforts in this stage must focus on concluding an accord on 50 per cent cut on offensive strategic weapons.

Another idea emphasized by Romania's representative is the need to come at an agreement, even if partial to begin with, on renunciation of underground nuclear weapon tests. Of outstanding importance would be the conclusion soon of a convention on banning completely and scrapping chemical weapons as an essential requisite of a safer world.

Romania, the speaker showed, will discharge faithfully all obligations assumed under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the accord on guarantees concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and will work for strengthening and extending the non-proliferation status.

With reference to CSCE negotiations on confidence-building and security measures in Europe the Romanian delegation is commissioned to work there too for the drafting of a first package of specific measures to enhance confidence and security in Europe, considering that the two texts could be signed at the CSCE summit.

ARGENTINA**Navy Incorporates Missile-Launching Corvette**

*PY0805171890 Buenos Aires LA PRENSA
in Spanish 6 May 90 p 5*

[Text] Bahia Blanca (TELAM)—The Parker corvette, equipped with Exocet missile launchers, was officially incorporated into the Sea Fleet during a ceremony held on 5 May at the inner harbor of the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base.

The ceremony was attended by Sea Fleet Commander Rear Admiral Raul Jose Cao. After the National Anthem was sung, Rear Admiral Carlos Luis Alfonso, general director of the Navy Materiel, delivered a speech.

The document ordering the incorporation of the corvette was read, and the boat was christened.

The Parker corvette is an excellent high-speed warship, considering its antisurface, antiaircraft, and antisubmarine capacity.

Meanwhile, a troop formation was held yesterday shortly after 0800 at the Commander Espora Air Naval Unit to mark Naval Aviation Day.

A speech was read during the ceremony presided over by Navy Captain Jorge Luis Colombo, the commander of the No. 2 Naval Air Unit.

Naval Aviation Day was established to recall the date on which the British Royal Navy missile destroyer Sheffield was sunk during the Malvinas war.

INDIA

Minister: No Change in Missile Development Program

*BK2305035490 Delhi Domestic Service in English
0240 GMT 23 May 90*

[Text] There is no change in the government's stand on missile development program, especially regarding Agni. Stating this in the Rajya Sabha yesterday, the

minister of state for defense, Dr Raja Ramanna, said undertaking of flight trials of Agni system is of a continuous nature. He also informed the House that Prithvi missile is likely to be on production from the middle of 1992.

Regarding advanced light helicopter, Dr Ramanna said the project is expected to be completed by 1993-94 and the revised cost of the project is estimated to be over 285 crore rupees.

Commentary on British Defense White Paper

90UM0458A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by TASS observer Vladimir Chernyshev: "Signals From the Past"]

[Text] The British government has published a "white paper" setting forth the basic directions of Great Britain's military policy for the 1990-1991 fiscal year. One must acknowledge frankly that this "authorized" document was awaited by the country with special interest. And this is quite understandable. The profound political changes in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, the reduction in armed forces and arms by Warsaw Pact states, and the continued progress at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe have vitally changed the strategic situation on the continent. As the English press has repeatedly stressed, all this has led to the need for fundamental revision of military strategy and developmental plans of Great Britain's armed forces.

In February and March, the English mass media organs increasingly hinted that a comprehensive study of defense policy was under way in the Defense Ministry and at Downing Street. It was reported that the government was approaching the concept of "balanced armed forces." With this goal they were generating a whole group of new documents on military development, and the Ministry of Defense was holding active discussions with the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the words of one highly-placed military spokesman, the goal was set of "sending correct signals, both to the East and to NATO colleagues." At the same time, according to the English press, the ongoing re-evaluation was supposed to "help Great Britain create defense forces more appropriate to a world in which the Soviet Union, while remaining the strongest power in Eurasia, constitutes a significantly smaller threat than before." It was proposed that the broad-scale re-evaluation touch not only on the needs of the armed forces in the future, but also on the prejudices of the past.

And now comes the "white paper", the fruit of "long and extensive analysis," submitted to the court of public opinion. What sort of "signals" does it send to East and West? The first signal: none of the key elements of British military policy will undergo any changes whatsoever. The second signal: in comparison with last year the country's military spending not only will not be reduced, it will even be somewhat increased (by 80 million pounds sterling) and in 1990-1991 fiscal year will amount to 21 billion 223 million pounds sterling. The third signal: no changes at all will be made in the structure of the armed forces or in the current programs of arms development and production. These signals, to put it mildly, not only are not future-oriented, they do

not even correspond to present realities. And if we may speak frankly, they seem to come from the past; "cold war" winds are blowing.

Especially conspicuous here is the fact that the "white paper" continues the plan for refitting the nuclear submarine fleet with "Trident" missiles. It proposes that expenses for the maintenance and modernization of nuclear forces be increased in comparison with last year (by redistribution of resources) by 322 million pounds sterling, raising them to 1 billion 480 million pounds sterling. Of course, to be fair we should also note the new element in Great Britain's military policy: the "white paper" now does not rule out the possibility that in the future, at some stage of the negotiations to reduce nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the U.S., British nuclear forces may be included in the discussion. Until recently such a possibility was completely discounted.

The majority of my English colleagues agree: the government has not lived up to the hopes of those Britains who hoped that the reduced tension in the international arena would allow a reduction in military spending.

How does the English government justify its current position? In a recent interview with the BBC, Thomas King, Great Britain's Secretary of State for Defense, stated: "At present there is serious concern, especially with respect to the situation in Lithuania, and therefore at this stage it would be absurd to rush about exclaiming that peace has already triumphed... so we cannot dismantle our defense and radically change our military strategy until we have a much better idea of the probable final result."

"Disappointing and uninspiring" was how the "white paper" was described by a spokesman for the liberal democrats. The decision of the Tory cabinet not to cut but to increase military spending was criticized by Martin O'Neil, a spokesman on defense matters for the Labor Party's "shadow cabinet." He stressed that this decision once again testifies to the continuing isolation of the British government in a period when everyone believes that it is possible to benefit from the peace opportunities presently opening up."

Correspondent Visits Dismantled Missile Base

90WC006A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
20 Apr 90 p 4

[Article by V. Karimov: "There Are No Missiles in Kattakurgan: Following Up the Article in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY"; List of missile bases cited in editorial introduction was also published in Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA—see JPRS-TAC-90-010, 18 April 1990, p 21]

[Text] In No 1 of VESTNIK MID SSSR for 1990, there is for the first time a list of all inhabited localities where "operational missile bases" (in the USSR) and "missile support facilities" (in the United States) are located.

"Where the missiles are hidden." ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No 6, 1990.

Among the 44 "points" named in the note is Kattakurgan, a city located 70 kilometers from Samarkand. Immediately after the publication of that article, I met with the officer Nikolay Tarasovich Gisyuk.

"I read it," he answered. "ARGUMENTY I FAKTY published out-of-date information. We do not have any missiles. You can see for yourself. And Officer Agafonov will accompany you."

Within 45 to 50 minutes Mikhail Petrovich and I were at the so-called "point" located in the Karnabchulskaya Steppe, where the missile launcher crewmen were also stationed. I had heard about their existence before, 15 or 20 years ago. Once at a fork in the road, we mistakenly turned to the right. Soon our vehicle was stopped by a serviceman: no admission here. We excused ourselves, turned around and left with a mixed feeling of secret illicitness and injured vanity.

That was then. This time the soldier opened the iron gate and signaled with his hand: Welcome! We were met by the officer Vadim Konstantinovich Ogatov.

"This is the first 'point'," he explained. "Missile launcher crewmen were formerly based here."

He showed us boxes in which tractor trucks with operational-tactical missiles OTR-22 were once stored. Now these shelters house "KamAZy" with trailers and some of the hangars are empty. The last missiles were removed from here for destruction in July 1988. They disbanded the missile launcher crewmen that same month and only guards remained for a time.

"In August of that same year, American observers arrived to monitor the performance of the treaty on the destruction of medium and shorter range missiles signed by the USSR and United States," recalls Mikhail Petrovich. "They looked things over and convinced themselves that everything is in order. After spending the night in a hotel especially equipped for them, they said good-by."

American observers also visited an operational missile base in March of last year. This time the visit was short, just a few hours. They appeared, looked things over, checked their own recognition signals (to make sure that they are being shown the right facilities) and left.

Under the provisions of the treaty, the guests will make such sudden visits over the course of 13 years. In their first visit, they inspected all three "points" but they visited only the first in the second visit.

What are the other two "points"? It is said that it [the second base] was once an auxiliary base for the first and third "points."

The third "point" is perhaps the most imposing in the sense of military technology and construction. But it is

probably also the one with the saddest fate. The facility was once particularly secret—strategic missiles were located here.

If you were to take away the obstacle of three rows of barbed wire and the guard towers with embrasures, which immediately give away the importance of the facility under guard, then you would never say that under ground at this place are located the silos where a titanic destructive force was once hidden. From above everything was covered by inoffensive massive hoods—try to determine what is under them.

From here they made test launches of missiles. Stars indicating the number of launches are drawn on a concrete projection next to each silo. "On the eve of the launches," relates I. Atakurbankov, director of a state pedigree stock farm, "the commander came and warned: tomorrow some exercises will begin at such and such a time. Keep the people calm and do not let them graze their sheep within a certain radius. At the appointed time, there was a tremendous rumble, the land shook, the glass rattled in houses and two or three powerful missiles with fiery trails rose into the sky. After a minute or so, having ejected their first stages, they disappeared from view."

It was somewhat frightening at first. But then they got used to it. They made friends with the military people. They lived with them in harmony and friendship. That is the whole story.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY published out-of-date information; there are no missiles here now.

But now let us return to the sad fate of the third "point." It is painful for me to talk about its state today. It looks like it would after being bombed out. I imagined the attention, diligence and care with which this facility was erected in its time. What was foreseen in the project plan was actually assembled. There were no substitutes. They us say that they were supposed to put in a heavy door. They put in a heavy one. That is how it was from tacks to complex instruments.

But the missile launcher crewmen have been disbanded. To guard the facility, they have left behind a few soldiers headed by a warrant officer. The local inhabitants say that the doors, window frames and floorboards that have disappeared are the work of that same warrant officer, who has established a real market in immovable property. If you need floorboards, pay your money and take them. They took away everything that they could, including reinforced concrete slabs.

As soon as the missile launcher crewmen left the place where they had lived and worked, the sovkhos management appealed to the corresponding agencies with the request that they be sold all of these structures. But the agencies asked such a high price that there was no sense in bargaining. But if they set a suitable price, you would see that one of the sovkhos departments could be located in an autonomous town with all municipal services.

But the reasonable and diligent path was replaced by mismanagement and negligence. And where? In the army, where it seemed that they were most interested in doing their work.

When you look at all this expensive desolation, you begin to understand why we are so poor. We will never become rich with this kind of attitude toward national property.

What happened to army discipline and the duty to the Fatherland?

From the editors: This material might not have reached a newspaper page and the officers of the military censorship of Turkestan Military District went to considerable efforts to see that it did not. Yes, as long as it exists, no army publication can see light without its approval.

This time PRAVDA VOSTOKA appealed in writing for permission to publish this article. They told us orally:

send the report to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. But in PRAVDA VOSTOKA you will be divulging a military secret!!! This is after the fact that not a single missile remained under Kattakurgan, which ceased to be a secret even for American observers.

Fortunately, the incompetent military censorship of Turkestan Military District is not the last instance of the material on the way to the newspaper page. We sent the report on the Kattakurgan missiles to the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, from where it returned to PRAVDA VOSTOKA with the stamp of approval.

What is behind this? The low level of professionalism of the Tashkent military censors? Excessive vigilance inexplicable by any logic? Or petty revenge against PRAVDA VOSTOKA for the criticism to which it has already subjected the military censorship of the district? And all for the same reason.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Worldwide Arms Makers Adjust to New Market

90EN0529A Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish
1 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Agnes Courades Allebeck of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): "International Arms Makers Victims of World Peace"; first paragraph is INFORMATION introduction]

[Text] On Friday LIBERATION, the French daily newspaper, published a list of the world's biggest noncommunist arms makers. It is estimated that about 100,000 industry jobs have been lost in the past three years.

The arms industry finds itself in a period of major changes. Some of the symptoms of the reconstruction now underway are the many mergers which have occurred recently within the industry and discussions about financing for programs such as EFA (European Fighting Aircraft).

What future can the defense industry expect in a time of disarmament efforts? Will it become "a victim of peace" or will it benefit from the positive effects on business of what has already been called "the peace dividend"?

Basic components of the security system which was set up in Europe as a consequence of the cold war have been turned upside down. Armed forces in the West are about to be reduced and restructured. The risk of a Soviet invasion has gotten smaller and smaller, and airplanes, tanks, missiles, and pieces of artillery are being withdrawn from their units. Western countries' defense budgets are stagnant or even in some cases being cut. The future for major military programs is uncertain.

Jobs

It is estimated that about 100,000 jobs have been lost in West European arms production during the past three years, most of those in ship building and heavy industry. In France, employment in this sector fell by 3.4 percent in 1987 and by 3.6 percent in 1988.

The biggest arms producers in the United States as well have reduced their staffs by several thousands and have announced further layoffs. Here are some of the figures: Lockheed, 8,000; Hughes Aircraft, 7,000; General Electric, 4,000; Rockwell, 4,000; Grumman, 3,100; Northrop, 2,500-3,000; and Textron, 2,500.

Fortunately not all those who were laid off are without prospects of getting a new job. For example, the boom in civil aviation has absorbed many who could potentially have been unemployed.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, has compiled a list of the world's top 100 arms makers. The Soviet Union and its allies, as well as China, which does not issue figures on this sector, do not appear on the list. Furthermore military production in those

countries has a structure which makes it impossible to compare with countries having a market economy.

The most striking fact from the list is that almost one-half of the top 100 arms makers—48, to be quite precise—are located in the United State. Twelve are located in Great Britain, 10 in France, and nine in West Germany.

Japanese Progress

The presence of five Japanese companies on the list is a clear indication of Japan's recent attempts to establish a military-industrial base. The rest of the list consists of five other companies from NATO countries (three Italian, one Dutch, and one Spanish), five from neutral countries (four Swedish and one Swiss) plus six companies from other countries (two Israeli, one South Korean, one South African, one Brazilian, and one Indian).

The American firms' domination is indisputable when one considers that the three biggest West European firms show up well down on the list. Only British Aerospace is among the six biggest, while the French Thomson, Inc. comes in in 12th place.

Not only are the American companies the most numerous but they also have the biggest sales. The fact that they alone account for two-thirds of all sales taken together is due to the size of the American defense budget plus those companies' domination of the domestic market.

By way of comparison, the share of all sales of the 12 British and the 10 French firms is 10 and 8.5 percent, respectively. The nine companies in the Federal Republic account for 5.5 percent.

Japan, which only recently began to get interested in arms production, is currently experiencing a boom in this industry. The good economic situation of Japanese industry has spread to the arms industry, which is about to turn into the favorite sector of Japanese investors.

The Third World

Despite persistent efforts on the part of several countries in the Third World, only six companies in this group rank among the top 100 arms makers. They are characterized by a large number of employees and very low productivity. These companies account for only 1.7 percent of the arms sales recorded on the list.

In 1988, an awareness that it was necessary to act in concert in the face of American competition led 13 European countries to adopt an "action plan for a European arms market." France was the originator of a key element of this plan, the EUCLID program, which involves cooperation on military research.

The program is based on the model of the EC's civilian EUREKA program. Some nevertheless believe that in the long term the EC—after the internal market is established—constitutes the best forum for realizing a

European arms market. Even if activities connected to defense in relation to the Treaty of Rome are outside the EC's jurisdiction, the Common Act's member countries are being urged to coordinate further in this area.

Smaller Market

As things currently stand, the arms market in Europe must perforce become smaller. Today it is difficult to justify growth in defense expenditures which are necessary to preserve the national defense industries found in Western Europe. On top of this, the trend in arms exports has been declining since 1984.

Presumably the expected restructuring of the market will lead to increased competition, and this could undermine efforts to establish European cooperation.

The many recent mergers and international company takeovers have also disturbed the arms industry. One example is Thomson—CSF's buyback of some of Philips' military activities and the merger of missile electronics departments at British Aerospace and Thomson—CSF which now goes under the name of Eurodynamics.

As it is, the arms industry is very concentrated. The first five companies on SIPRI's list—all American—account for more than one-fifth of all world sales, the top 10 for more than 36 percent, and the top 25 for almost two-thirds.

Electronics firms and firms which manufacture airplanes and missiles are the best represented in SIPRI's study—showing that the traditional sectors in the arms industry (anti-tank defenses and artillery) and ship building have been overtaken by the high technology sectors. Time will tell whether this trend will continue.

Production Diversification

With the smaller future market for arms in mind, these companies have had to diversify their production. The more a company depends on arms production, the harder it is for the company to establish itself in the civilian market.

Only three companies among the top 100 depend entirely on arms production: this is the case with two French companies, Direction des constructions navales and GIAT, both of which report to the Defense Ministry, and the British VSEL group. Furthermore, 13 companies are 50-percent dependent on arms production. It is characteristic for the French firms to be highly dependent on arms production—with the exception of Matra and Renault, which are near the bottom of SIPRI's list.

Those companies which are clearly among the biggest but whose production is very diversified—for example, General Motors, Daimler Benz, IBM, and Mitsubishi—will find it easy to adapt to the unavoidable restructuring of the arms market. The others run the risk of rapidly being confronted by the fact of their inability to adapt.

**The Top 100 Arms Makers in OECD Countries and the Third World in 1988;
Volume of business and profits in millions of dollars**

Rank	Company	Country	Weapon types	Amount of arms sales	Total sales	Percentage arms sales	Profits	Number of employees
1	McDonnell Douglas Corp.	United States	P/C/M	8,500	15,072	56	350	121,000
2	Lockheed	United States	P	8,400	10,590	79	624	86,800
3	General Dynamics Corp.	United States	P/C/M/S	8,000	9,551	84	379	102,800
4	General Electric	United States	P/E	6,250	49,414	13	3,386	298,000
5	General Motors	United States	P/E/C/M	6,000	121,088	5	4,856	766,000
6	Raytheon	United States	C/M	5,500	8,192	67	490	75,000
7	British Aerospace	UK	P/C/M	5,470	10,044	54	277	131,300
8	Rockwell International	United States	P/C/M	5,000	11,946	42	812	116,000
9	Boeing	United States	P/C/M	4,500	16,962	27	614	153,000
10	Northrop	United States	P	4,500	5,797	78	104	42,000
11	United Technologies	United States	P/C/M	4,500	18,000	25	659	186,800
12	Thomson, S.A.	France	A/C	4,470	12,566	36	200	104,000
13	Martin Marietta	United States	M	4,300	5,728	75	359	67,500
14	GEC	UK	C/E	3,850	11,004	35	803	157,000
15	Daimler-Benz	FRG	P/E/C/V	3,420	41,851	8	909	339,000
16	TRW, Inc.	United States	C/V	3,200	6,982	46	261	73,200

**The Top 100 Arms Makers in OECD Countries and the Third World in 1988;
Volume of business and profits in millions of dollars (Continued)**

Rank	Company	Country	Weapon types	Amount of arms sales	Total sales	Percentage arms sales	Profits	Number of employees
17	Mitsubishi Corporation	Japan	P/M/C/V	3,100	58,395	5	229	—
18	Grumman	United States	P/C	3,000	3,649	82	87	32,000
19	Litton Industries	United States	S/C/M	2,920	4,864	60	167	55,000
20	Westinghouse Electric	United States	C	2,600	12,500	21	823	119,640
21	Unisys	United States	C	2,500	9,902	25	681	92,000
22	Aerospatiale	France	P/M	2,300	4,700	49	15	34,250
23	Kawasaki Heavy Industries	Japan	P/S/M/E	2,230	5,985	37	62	16,600
24	Direction des constructions navales	France	S	2,210	2,214	100	—	28,000
25	Texas Instruments	United States	C/O	2,150	6,295	34	366	75,700
26	IRI	Italy	P/S/C/E	2,100	37,812	6	731	358,213
27	IBM	United States	O	2,100	59,681	4	5,806	387,000
28	Dassault-Breguet	France	P	2,080	2,964	70	65	13,818
29	MBB	FRG	P/M/C	1,990	4,054	49	56	40,000
30	Honeywell Marine Systems	United States	C/F	1,800	7,148	25	435	79,000
31	LTV	United States	P/M/C/V	1,800	7,526	24	3,154	—
32	Tenneco, Inc.	United States	S	1,670	13,234	13	822	94,000
33	EFIM	Italy	P/C/V	1,520	3,551	43	19	37,405
34	FIAT	Italy	E/A/C/V	1,500	34,041	4	2,492	277,353
35	Philips	Netherlands	C	1,500	28,371	5	1,228	310,000
36	Allied Signal	United States	P/C	1,500	11,909	13	463	115,000
37	Textron	United States	P/E/V	1,500	7,111	21	234	60,000
38	Singer	United States	C	1,420	1,903	75	—	28,000
39	Rolls Royce	UK	E	1,410	3,514	40	258	40,900
40	ITT	United States	C	1,400	19,355	7	817	117,000
41	Thorn EMI	UK	C	1,200	6,002	20	529	65,400
42	E-Systems	United States	P/C	1,200	1,439	83	75	—
43	Ford Motor	United States	C/V	1,200	92,446	1	5,300	360,000
44	Ferranti-International Signal	UK	C	1,170	1,464	80	65	26,980
45	GIAT	France	A/V	1,150	1,151	100	83	14,740
46	GET	United States	C	1,100	16,460	7	1,225	159,000
47	Harris	United States	C	1,000	2,062	48	101	27,000
48	Loral	United States	C	1,000	1,440	69	74	14,000
49	CASA	Spain	P	980	1,515	65	—	10,200
51	Oerlikon-Bührle	Switzerland	P/C/A	930	2,891	32	23	27,750
52	Hercules	United States	P/M/F	890	2,802	32	120	22,700
53	Plessey	UK	C	880	2,947	30	237	26,216
54	Gencorp	United States	P/E/C/M	880	1,891	47	148	15,600
55	VSEL Consortium	UK	S/V	830	830	100	28	10,782
56	Nobel Industries	Sweden	A/C/M/F	810	3,480	23	113	22,101

The Top 100 Arms Makers in OECD Countries and the Third World in 1988;
Volume of business and profits in millions of dollars (Continued)

Rank	Company	Country	Weapon types	Amount of arms sales	Total sales	Percentage arms sales	Profits	Number of employees
57	Siemens	FRG	C	800	33,823	2	791	353,000
58	Israeli Aircraft Industries	Israel	P/M/C/S	800	1,060	75	21	16,500
59	SNECMA	France	E	770	1,722	45	41	13,482
60	Sequa	United States	C/E	700	1,948	36	69	—
61	Hawker Siddeley	UK	P/E	680	3,327	20	198	42,000
62	Rheinmetall	FRG	A/F	650	1,850	35	47	15,460
63	Toshiba	Japan	C	650	27,876	2	473	122,000
64	AT&T	United States	C	650	57,974	1	1,669	305,000
65	Krupp	FRG	V/C	630	8,391	8	115	63,391
66	Diehl	FRG	V/F	610	1,360	45	—	14,200
67	Thyssen	FRG	S/M	600	9,563	6	211	128,700
68	Ishikawajim-Harima	Japan	E/S	600	6,175	10	4	16,000
69	Daewoo	South Korea	C/S	600	13,438	4	36	94,888
70	Motorola	United States	C	600	8,250	7	445	102,000
71	Teledyne	United States	E/C/M	600	4,401	14	392	43,800
72	Thiokol Corporation	United States	E/M	580	1,168	50	33	12,600
73	SAAB-SCANIA	Sweden	P/C/M	570	6,934	8	255	48,500
74	Electronique Serge Dassault	France	C	510	678	75	19	4,100
75	FFV	Sweden	C/F/O	490	983	50	5	10,037
76	Racal Electronics	UK	C	480	2,831	17	261	33,702
77	Computer Sciences, Inc.	United States	C	480	1,034	37	53	22,500
78	Sundstrand	United States	P	470	1,477	32	77	—
79	Westland	UK	P	450	637	71	31	9,163
80	Avondale Industries	United States	S	450	592	76	4	8,000
81	Matra	France	M	440	3,239	14	172	19,480
82	Armcor	South Africa	C/P/V/A/F	440	884	50	—	90,000
83	Hunting Associated Ind.	UK	C/F	440	713	62	33	5,596
84	Control Data	United States	C	400	3,628	11	2	33,500
85	Emerson Electric	United States	C	400	6,651	6	529	—
86	Harsco	United States	O	400	1,278	31	46	—
87	Olin	United States	C	400	2,308	17	98	—
88	Nippon Electric	Japan	C	390	19,626	2	183	102,450
89	Ericsson	Sweden	C	390	5,107	8	214	65,000
90	Vickers	UK	E/V/F	390	1,382	28	—	16,731
91	Krauss-Maffei	FRG	V	380	723	53	1	5,100
92	Avibras	Brazil	A/M	370	390	95	1	3,500
93	Hindustan Aeronautics	India	P	360	494	73	—	48,833
94	Koor Industries	Israel	E/C	360	2,638	14	151	26,000

**The Top 100 Arms Makers in OECD Countries and the Third World in 1988;
Volume of business and profits in millions of dollars (Continued)**

Rank	Company	Country	Weapon types	Amount of arms sales	Total sales	Percentage arms sales	Profits	Number of employees
95	SAGEM	France	C	350	1,606	22	30	17,484
96	Dyncorp	United States	P/C	350	556	63	15	—
97	Mitre	United States	C	350	425	82	—	—
98	Westmark Systems	United States	C	350	702	50	—	—
99	Renault Vehicules Ind.	France	V	340	5,707	6	167	34,000
100	Standard Elektronik Lorenz	FRG	C	320	2,286	14	95	23,000

Key to weapon types: artillery, A; aircraft, P; electronics, C; firearms, F; missiles, M; vehicles, V; ships, S; engines, E; other, O

[There was no entry number 50 in the original document]

NATO's Woerner on Unification, Strategy

AU0905164590 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 May 90 pp 1,2

[Report by W.I.E.]

[Text] Washington—NATO Secretary General Woerner has offered the Soviet Union a "security partnership" with the Western Alliance, but rejected double membership of a united Germany in both military alliances. In an interview with FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, Woerner spoke against any "disguised form of neutrality" and suggested that an "all-German sovereign state" should make a decision on alliance membership as soon as possible. Firm incorporation of the Germans in the West is both in the interest of Moscow and the other Warsaw Pact states, he stressed.

Woerner made these statements after a meeting with President Bush at the White House, which focused on the NATO summit scheduled to take place in London at the beginning of July, the results of the "two-plus-four" talks held during the weekend [5-6 May], as well as the "future European security system." From Washington, Woerner departed for Calgary to participate in a two-day meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group. On Wednesday [9 May] and Thursday [10 May], there the alliance's defense ministers want to discuss concepts for a new nuclear strategy and, above all, the consequences of Bush's renunciation of the modernization of the land-based nuclear short-range missiles in Europe.

Woerner's visits to the United States and Canada are part of a host of diplomatic activities that deal both with NATO matters and general security issues. They are devoted to consultations prior to the next meeting between President Bush and Gorbachev at the end of May, as well as to the preparation of the first visits by a NATO secretary general to Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw.

The Soviet Union "has not yet moved" in the debate on German NATO membership, Woerner pointed out. Asked why German NATO membership would also be in

the interest of the Soviet Union, he replied: "First of all, for stability reasons. If Germany were not incorporated in an alliance, all states would try to win Germany's favor, and they would also try to control it. This would lead Europe back to the situation of the power policy, which turned out to be fatal at the beginning of this century. It would give rise to instability in Europe which would trigger retrogressive developments in history. What is needed is integration in the bilateral and multi-lateral sphere. Second, the Soviet Union would win a reliable partner, not only in the shape of a united Germany."

The offer to accept the Soviet Union as a "security partner" is a "future-oriented idea" which would involve three things: Cooperation in favor of a "comprehensive security structure" within the framework of the CSCE; direct contacts between NATO and the Soviet Union; and further talks on arms control, aimed at restructuring the armed forces in a way "that are no longer seen as a threat by either side."

Woerner does not think much of a double membership of Germany in both alliances during a "transition period" leading to unification. Asked whether double membership would not continue to exist anyway in an ongoing process of unification—monetary union, prospect of all-German elections—he stated: "This will give rise to very complicated legal problems, but also practical problems. I believe that Germany, once it is unified, must quickly make a decision on alliance membership. Both alliances are entitled to that. I do not think that it would be very realistic for the Soviet Union to try to maintain control over a united Germany."

Asked whether he would prefer a decision by an all-German government or a referendum, he pointed out that this is a "matter that concerns only the Germans." "However, as a German citizen, I personally do not consider referendums very useful—because of the lessons that history has taught us and because of the expert knowledge that is required to make decisions on such decisive issues."

In a united Germany that should belong to NATO, U.S. forces and nuclear weapons should continue to be deployed, Woerner stressed. The weapons should continue to be subject to NATO control. Asked whether the nuclear arsenal should be limited to the territory of the present-day GDR out of consideration for Moscow, he stressed: "The Alliance and the FRG reject a denuclearization of Europe and of the FRG. On the other hand, we are determined to take into account the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. We have already stated that we do not want to extend our troops beyond FRG territory. This naturally applies to the remaining nuclear weapons as well."

Woerner considers President Bush's renunciation of the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles and his offer for talks to Moscow "a good decision in the interest of the Alliance and of the international situation." This decision by the West is of considerable military significance which signals to the Soviet Union not only the West's intention not to threaten anyone, but also that the West is ready "to take into consideration the changes that have taken place (in Europe)." Further talks will be required with the Soviet Union on the remaining "Lance" systems because the Soviet Union has a 13-fold superiority in this sphere.

At the same time, Bush's renunciation represents an opportunity for NATO to reconsider its entire nuclear strategy. This will be the main topic of the conference in Calgary. The defense ministers want to ask the NATO commander in chief, General Galvin, to newly determine the need for nuclear weapons in a comprehensive study. This also applies to plans concerning air-borne short-range missiles, which are not intended as a "replacement." "If we are willing to renounce modernization, which will, in the long run, also include these types of weapons, we are doing this because of the changed situation. I do not see a compensation for such a step."

As a result of the strategic reconsideration, Woerner wants to create a "new image for NATO." It should become obvious that NATO is no longer an "element of confrontation, but an element of cooperation" with Eastern Europe. It is an alliance that does not need "an opponent or enemy," and whose military tasks "will increasingly shift from deterrence to the limitation of risks."

Woerner would like to explain "NATO's changed role" during his visits to Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw in the next few months, and make it clear that "we are ready to make our contribution to the success of the reform movements and to the construction of democracy. When receiving representatives of the Warsaw Pact in Brussels, he noted "remarkably" different attitudes within the Eastern alliance. The Soviet Union "finds it difficult to bindingly define the outlines, the shape, and the contents of a future pact system."

There is open dissent over membership in NATO of a united Germany. The Soviet Union "has received no

support whatsoever in its call for neutralization" among its allies. Woerner explains why: "A certain concern over a united Germany naturally plays a certain role here. If incorporated in the Western structures—the EC and NATO—Germany is viewed as a predictable and stable partner. By the way, it is well known that NATO is a purely defensive alliance. I think that Soviet officials must slowly become aware of this as well. NATO poses no threat to anyone. By the way, I do not know how 16 democratic states could be induced to attack another state. This is impossible, and apart from that, the military potential needed for such an attack does not exist."

Bonn's Envoy on CFE Vienna Negotiations

AU1305203090 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT
in German 9 May 90 p 10

[Report by Ewald Stein]

[Text] Vienna—More than one year after its start in March 1989, respiratory problems can be noted at the Vienna CFE talks, the course of which has been characterized so far by a surprisingly high speed of negotiations. Nevertheless, Ambassador Ruediger Hartmann, head of Bonn's CFE delegation, hopes that an appropriate treaty will be formulated by this autumn and that it can be concluded at the CSCE summit, which will probably be scheduled this November.

In an interview with HANDELSBLATT, Hartmann cites two reasons, above all, for the current difficulties in Vienna where delegations from the 23 member states of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact have just concluded their sixth round of negotiations. Thus, in particular the negotiations on technical details and definitions require an extreme amount of time as a result of their complicated nature and lead to certain delays.

Hartmann explained this with two prominent examples: "We are negotiating on armored personnel carriers. From the outside they look very much like command vehicles or radio direction finding vehicles, but their equipment is different. How does one delineate these things?"

The same goes for armored transport vehicles. Thus, all over the Soviet Union, a vehicle called MT-LB is used as a tractor for artillery. Only in the Leningrad Military District, it is also used as a troop transporter because of the geographical characteristics there. "We do not know how we can distinguish between these two types, if they are different types at all. Thus, a difference of 3,000 vehicles develops. Given a planned upper limit of 28,000 to 30,000 vehicles all over Europe this amount is not negligible."

According to Hartmann, who has been dealing with questions of disarmament and arms control in various positions in the Foreign Ministry since 1970, there is widespread agreement at the CFE on the extent of

disarmament. Now it is, above all, important to find exact formulations for the treaty, in particular concerning verification.

Since the CFE is the "most complicated disarmament negotiation ever held," a comparison with other arms control forums, for instance with the former and successful negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) or on strategic systems (START) is hardly possible. This is all the more so since, after all, 23 countries are negotiating in Vienna, while the START and INF talks were bilateral negotiations between Moscow and Washington. "Our American colleagues also say this." Consequently, Bonn's ambassador does not see a bad omen for the CFE in the postponement of the START treaty, which should originally have been signed at the meeting between U.S. President Bush and Soviet state and party head Gorbachev at the end of May/beginning of June, which was held early.

The second reason for delay is of a political nature, according to Hartmann. Thus, the quick progress in negotiations so far were mainly due to the "political loosening up" in Eastern Europe, which then, however developed into a "revolution." The Bonn disarmament expert sees three aspects in this, which are of essential importance for the CFE:

- the internal development in the Soviet Union, "catchword Lithuania";
- the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, "which practically only exists on paper now";
- the German question.

In Hartmann's view, all three above-mentioned aspects have a military effect from the Soviet viewpoint. Therefore, the leadership in Moscow sees itself confronted with the question of which conclusions it should draw from this for the CFE. START in Geneva and the negotiations on inspections from the air (Open Skies) are also affected by the "element of delay" caused by the Soviet Union as a result of a pause for thought. Hartmann: "We are obviously dealing with a reconsideration of the Soviet policy—this is also what our Eastern negotiating partners say—and we hope that the reconsideration will be concluded soon."

However, he does not believe in a fundamental change of course on the part of the Kremlin, only in a "staking out of certain positions." In this respect, confidence is a duty for the FRG chief negotiator at the CFE: "We have the assignment to finish by November, and everyone in Vienna is aware of this. We all are working very intensively."

Hartmann assesses positively the fact that the word, Lithuania, has never been mentioned so far, neither at the Vienna negotiating table, "nor in the corridors." However, for him, the development in the Warsaw Pact is clear proof of the fact that the starting positions in Vienna have changed. This was repeatedly discussed particularly during the sixth round of negotiations. However: "I think we are well advised not to adopt any

position on whether it is a pity or it is good that the Warsaw Pact is as it is today. The peoples in Eastern Europe have to decide this themselves."

In this connection, the ambassador gives high praise to some East European countries: "In particular the Hungarians, the Poles, the Czechoslovaks, and, most recently, also the GDR are acting with great responsibility." Even though these states are interested in strengthening their national identity, at the same time, they also realize that one cannot develop a new concept in the middle of negotiations so as not to disturb the process. Of course, CFE follow-up conferences and the CSCE framework offer prospects for potential revisions.

Hartmann does not share fears that the Soviet leadership wants to wait for first results of the recently started negotiations of the two German states and the four victorious powers on German unification ("two-plus-four") in order to then, perhaps, present new arguments at the CFE: "There are no such statements by the Soviet side." However, he does see the need to clarify "a certain relationship between the two fronts."

Even though military aspects of German unification can be discussed within the "two-plus-four framework," troops strengths in Germany or the question of what is going to happen to GDR equipment mentioned in the treaty cannot be discussed. "This would mean a singularization of Germany. And this is something we cannot desire." Detailed regulations must be clearly worked out at a multilateral level. Only then is the equal treatment of all states ensured. On the other hand, the discussion on a NATO membership for Germany does not belong at the CFE table.

The Atlantic Alliance Has To Draw Conclusions

Hartmann hardly sees the danger that the disarmament idea may be undermined by demands, which are occasionally heard from military men and from the Brussels NATO headquarters, according to which gaps in security, which are caused by disarmament, should at least be partly filled by the development and production of new systems with higher capacity in small numbers: "This is a very military point of view. In general, it does not take into account the fact that disarmament is the expression of a political will." He points out that during and after the INF negotiations, there were also similar arguments. "However, today we know that decisive things have changed in Europe because—but not exclusively—of the INF treaty."

In Hartmann's view, the Atlantic Alliance has to draw very important conclusions and must come to a clear realization of what the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact would mean. After all, in the East, there are now a number of states that "are basically hitching themselves to the West." In this connection, the CFE chief negotiator quotes the Hungarian delegation head, who spoke of a "cordon sanitaire" of NATO in a statement at the plenary session. Hartmann: "And, therefore, arguments,

which are aimed at the premise that the things which are disarmed must be compensated for, is short-sighted."

Many Things Speak for a Conclusion as Soon as Possible

Hartmann admits that disarmament will certainly not be for free. On the contrary: "It will have horrendous costs." As an example, he cites investments to prevent environmental pollution by the destruction of military equipment. Thus, the Warsaw Pact alone has to disarm 40,000 tanks, "and tanks are made of steel." In any case, both in Vienna and at the FRG Defense Ministry, experts for so-called destruction methods are wanted.

The disarmament expert also does not share the concern about increased arms exports, to, among others, Third World countries. One proceeds from the premise that the material that will be covered by a CFE treaty will indeed be destroyed, at least to the extent that it cannot be used as a weapon again. This point is also particularly stressed by the Americans.

On the other hand, Hartmann does not want to completely rule out that some countries are already reducing their stocks before the conclusion of a treaty; in this connection, the potential temptation of the respective industries to use free facilities for higher export must be countered at the national level. This also speaks for a conclusion of the CFE as soon as possible.

In Hartmann's view, aircraft also have to be intensively discussed at disarmament negotiations soon. In contrast to all other categories of weapons, there has hardly been any movement in this respect. The reason he sees behind Moscow's hesitation is that many Soviet military men had seen here some sort of possibility for compensation because of the alleged Western superiority concerning aircraft, which they claimed originally—while in all other fields Eastern superiority is confirmed. Hartmann: "The Soviet Union has to give up such ideas. And, quite obviously, this is difficult for it."

Hartmann assesses the question of aircraft as a key question of the disarmament negotiations, in particular because as a result of the political changes in Europe—he again refers to the cordon sanitaire—the NATO area can be reached by the Soviet Union and the other way round only by aircraft.

This means: "Now we are dealing with the dangerous instruments of conflict, and, therefore this element must be included quickly." This is also necessary because it will be increasingly difficult to stick to the negotiating concept, which is based on East-West parity, the longer the negotiations last and the faster the political changes in the East progress.

Disarmament Negotiations Later Within the CSCE Framework

Concerning the further disarmament process, Hartmann has a "very personal terminology," calling the stage after the CFE "Vienna II." He imagines a continuation of the

current negotiations, which, however, should be very limited in terms of time and may last at the most until the forthcoming CSCE follow-up conference in Helsinki in 1992.

Subsequently, disarmament negotiations would then take place within the CSCE process.

Stoltenberg Views Disarmament, Calgary Meeting

AU1105151190 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1100 GMT 11 May 90

[Interview with FRG Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg by Rolf Klement in Calgary on 11 May—recorded]

[Text] [Moderator] The two-day meeting of the Atlantic alliance ended in Calgary on Thursday [10 May]. While the defense ministers agreed that short-range nuclear weapons will be unilaterally removed from Europe, they did not agree on the timeframe. At the end of the meeting, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner made the surprising statement that he did not doubt that a unified Germany would also accept new systems. Rolf Klement discussed this with Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg following the conclusion of the meeting. The minister began with an assessment of the NATO meeting:

[Stoltenberg] The defense ministers have clearly advocated using the substantial positive changes in Europe to push the arms control process and disarmament policy. Based on President Bush's initiative, we have expressly welcomed the fact that in the talks, nuclear weapons, particularly the land-based systems, will also be included earlier than was originally planned.

The concept submitted by the U.S. President means that we have a chance to eliminate all land-based short-range weapons in Central Europe. However, if we want to hold negotiations with the Soviet Union soon, the Soviet Union must be ready to do so, too. That would mean that we could achieve a considerable reduction in nuclear weapons in Europe. It would also mean that for the required minimum nuclear component in Europe, the Atlantic Alliance would concentrate on air-based and sea-based systems.

[Klement] In your view, when will the air-based systems be introduced into NATO?

[Stoltenberg] We have air-based systems. We do not have the power to use the nuclear weapons, nor do we seek to have such power. In regard to a unified Germany, we are also ready to confirm our renunciation by an international treaty. However, in the event of defense, our Air Force would control U.S. systems, as has been laid down in NATO resolutions, and according to the decisions that will have to be made by the alliance and in particular the U.S. President. That will basically also apply to the future and is also valid for other countries in Western Europe that do not have nuclear weapons.

Whether it will be possible to reduce the number of air-based systems at disarmament negotiations remains to be seen.

[Klement] NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner said at the final news conference yesterday [10 May] that the Federal Government, the FRG, and the people are, of course, ready to accept new modern air-based nuclear weapons, just as they accepted the NATO two-track decision at that time. Is the position Woerner stated at the news conference one that you coordinated within NATO, a position that has been agreed upon with the Federal Government?

[Stoltenberg] The Federal Government's position is—and we are in agreement with our allies in this respect—that the studies begun last fall on the future structure of a minimum number of nuclear weapons will be continued. No preliminary decision has been made about the introduction of certain systems. However, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union continues to modernize its nuclear systems in its sphere, we must examine whether the need to develop or introduce certain new weapons will arise later on.

[Klement] That means that Woerner's statement was at least rash.

[Stoltenberg] It is a political assessment intended for the future. However, the conditions for making decisions now do not yet exist. Nor has anyone urged such decisions now.

[Klement] Do you personally or does the Federal Government have an idea when the land-based weapons—both the nuclear artillery shells and nuclear missiles—will be removed from Central Europe?

[Stoltenberg] As you know, the negotiations will be resumed in December this year or early next year. After having agreed on the principles, it will, of course, take some time for us to prepare a detailed negotiating concept. The chiefs of state and government will certainly also deal with that important problem at their meeting early in July.

We have a very clear idea. The best thing would be the renunciation of land-based systems in both East and West. Regarding nuclear artillery shells, we have said publicly since January that the political changes in Europe, the prospect of German unification in the foreseeable future, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the CSFR, which has been contractually agreed upon and is beginning now—that all this does not give a system including nuclear artillery much of a future.

The details of how to achieve that result will have to be discussed and will also depend on a similar development in the Soviet Union. One of the problems is that the issue of verifiability is always of importance in arms control negotiations. According to experts, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to verify any relevant agreement.

Thus, we will have to consider whether there are forms of achieving such a mutual renunciation other than the usual arms control negotiations.

NATO Chief on Role of GDR, Soviet Union

*LD1305101890 Hamburg DPA in German 0827 GMT
13 May 90*

[Text] Frankfurt (DPA)—If the Warsaw Pact states are able to force reform of their alliance "in free self-determination", this alliance could then become part of the future new security order, in the NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner's view. Woerner said today on Hesse Radio's "Frankfurt Interview" that NATO will also be part of such an order. Its security function can only be supplemented and not replaced.

In response to the question of the effects of the GDR joining the Federal Republic under Article 23 of the basic Law, Woerner said that it is not the job of the secretary general of NATO to speculate publicly about such legal questions which also touch upon the GDR's relationship with the Soviet Union. However the GDR's accession under Article 23 will certainly include NATO membership for the whole of Germany.

According to Woerner, NATO cannot do without nuclear deterrence completely. There is no point in the complete denuclearization of Europe as there will, with the Soviet Union, be a superpower which will continue to retain "thousands and thousands" of strategic weapons for the foreseeable future. Nobody loves nuclear weapons, and he himself is no fan of weapons, but one cannot close one's eyes to reality. The problem is to reduce nuclear weapons to the minimum necessary to rule out wars.

Genscher Addresses IPU Meeting

*LD2105104990 Hamburg DPA in German 1014 GMT
20 May 90*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—According to Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, disarmament remains "a key to German and European unification." At the opening of the worldwide disarmament conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) today in Bonn, Genscher closely linked the disarmament process with the search for future security systems and stability in Europe.

The NATO summit on 5 July will provide answers to the question of a system for binding both the United States and the Soviet Union in cooperative security. In the future the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will play a significant role. In face of the democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, the strengthening and institutionalization of the CSCE process has become urgently necessary.

Genscher emphasized the increasing political function of the alliances. In this connection it is important for a first agreement to be concluded at the Vienna negotiations on

conventional disarmament in good time for the summit of the 35 CSCE states in late autumn. Immediately after it is signed the negotiations on the elimination of nuclear short-range systems and nuclear artillery can begin.

Genscher warned the delegates from the developing countries against excessive expectations of a "peace dividend." First, no one can predict its amount, and second, "disarmament also costs money first of all."

Disarmament also has to contribute toward defusing regional conflicts in other parts of the world, Bundestag President Rita Suessmuth stated today at the opening of the IPU conference. She predicted for 1990 the concluding of basic security political agreements, from confidence building to the abolition of chemical weapons. As head of the German delegation, the foreign policy spokeswoman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union parliamentary group, Michaela Geiger, emphasized the pace-setting role of the Federal Republic, for example in the disarmament of chemical weapons.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Stoltenberg Supports Third Zero Option

AU1105140890 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 11 May 90 p 1

["fy" report: "Stoltenberg Supports Goal of Third Zero Option"]

[Excerpt] Kananaskis—The NATO defense ministers, who met within the framework of nuclear planning in Kananaskis (Canada), discussed changes in the strategy of the Western alliance. Talks focused above all on the impact of the political changes on nuclear strategy and NATO's weapons. Defense Minister Stoltenberg supported the goal of a third zero option, which would include the elimination of land-based short-range nuclear missiles in East and West. At the same time he stated that it is conceivable that NATO will unilaterally remove its nuclear artillery systems from Europe. The scope and the structure of the U.S. nuclear weapons that would still remain in Europe, would have to be newly determined. The opinion of the NATO commander in chief for Europe on that issue is important. By renouncing land-based nuclear weapons, the air- and sea-based nuclear weapons would gain increasing significance, Stoltenberg stressed, referring to the discussion about developing air-launched nuclear missiles with a range of over 400 km. However, the time has not come yet to make decisions on such a system.

The FRG defense minister also hinted that he favors changes concerning NATO's strategy of "flexible response," not only in nuclear, but also conventional weapons. Stoltenberg stressed that he has pointed out to the defense ministers and to NATO Secretary General Woerner that it is their task to submit proposals to the

heads of governments to provide a basis for discussion on NATO's future strategy during the summit at the beginning of July. At a defense ministers' conference to be held in Brussels in two weeks, the defense ministers will deal with those proposals. Their aim is to formulate "certain basic principles." However, there will not be enough time to work out details. For that reason, no new NATO strategy is to be expected before July. [passage omitted]

Social Democrats Reject New Nuclear Missiles

LD1105161490 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1527 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—In a statement published in Bonn today the Social Democratic Party stressed that there is no place in Europe for new nuclear missiles such as nuclear air-to-ground missiles. The Social Democrats reject in the statement the claim made at the meeting in Canada by NATO's nuclear planning group that sub-strategic nuclear systems "are acquiring relatively greater importance" on account of their flexibility and greater range. This statement was just the "overture to a new arms program for nuclear air-to-ground missiles with a range of over 400 km", they say.

Meckel Rejects Membership in Two Alliances

AU1105141990 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 11 May 90 p 1

["Sto." report: "Meckel Considers Double Membership in Alliances 'Inconceivable'"]

[Excerpt] Strasbourg, 10 May—GDR Foreign Minister Meckel, in a speech to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, described membership of a united Germany in NATO and the Warsaw Pact as "inconceivable." He would only accept it for a transitional period. However, that would have to be regulated prior to unification with the four victorious powers in a treaty. Unification can not be achieved before all issues, including the external aspects of German unification and the "elimination of all rights of the four powers in a treaty," are resolved, the GDR foreign minister pointed out. Transitional periods, such as those concerning the deployment of Soviet troops on GDR territory, are to be settled in an agreement. Clarification of membership in an alliance, however, requires the willingness of the Atlantic Alliance to change. "Without a reform of NATO, Moscow will never agree to membership in NATO of a united Germany," Meckel stressed in Strasbourg.

Referring to the Oder-Neisse line, he stated that the "inviolability of the border is an essential element for the future of Germany." One should not speak about "shifting the border," but about how it can be made easier to cross the border. Despite the fact that the border will be the external boundary for the EC to the east after German unification and the elimination of inner-German border controls, everything must be done to

make it possible for people to cross the border in both directions freely and in an unimpeded manner. [passage omitted]

Government Prevents Smuggling of Plant to Libya

*AU1405140090 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
12 May 90 p 1*

[Report by D.W.]

[Text] Bonn—The quick reaction of the FRG Government prevented the illegal acquisition of a large technical facility for a second poison gas factory in Libya through German companies. According to reliable information gained by DIE WELT from government circles in Bonn, the Siemens company "Teleperm M" control facility was supposed to be smuggled to Libya. Such a facility had also been used for the poison gas factory in al-Rabitah.

Siemens, which has become sensitive because of the highly political and international debate surrounding al-Rabitah, gave Bonn a tip after the "Teleperm M" had been ordered by the Abacus company (Ulm). The distribution channel and the final destination of the facility in Libya were intended to be covered up by using companies in Panama and in the Netherlands. It was also to be achieved by claiming that the facility was to go to Saudi Arabia. The string-puller in the background allegedly was Uthai Thiembunkit, head of the Supachoke company in Bangkok. He is also suspected of having been the "acquirer" of the first poison gas factory in al-Rabitah.

In Bonn it was said that there is concern about indications that another combat agent factory is to be built in Libya after al-Rabitah. The location might be Sabha or Birak, about 650 km south of Tripoli. Sabha itself is a major military base and is also linked with Libyan research in bacteriological weapons and development of missiles, it was said. Reportedly a project is planned that is "almost identical" to the Pharma-150 complex in al-Rabitah. It is also intended to produce the same combat agents there—lewisite and sarin. However, according to available information, the construction of the facility has not yet started.

The FRG Government is determined to "prevent a second al-Rabitah." Any delivery of a poison gas facility in Libya is prohibited. Tripoli has been notified that "any further attempt to acquire a poison gas facility would lead to a serious strain in relations." In addition, the FRG Government reportedly suggested joint initiatives with the EC. In that connection, it was pointed out that after al-Rabitah customs officials were told a year ago and repeatedly ever since to check deliveries to "sensitive countries" particularly carefully.

The industry has also repeatedly been warned against the risks of acquiring spare parts in the FRG. The Federal Economic Office now has more than 90 additional employees. During this year, another 68 posts, including 28 for engineers, natural scientists, and information technologists, are to be filled. The export of facilities or

parts that facilitate the production of poison gases requires a special permit. That also applies to the transfer of knowledge and know-how for such facilities. Bonn has decided not to grant such permits. Investigation procedures are underway against the Abacus, Liebert (both in Ulm), and Rose (Stuttgart) companies.

According to further information gained by DIE WELT from government circles, the "large-scale fire" reported by Libya to have taken place in the poison gas factory in al-Rabitah on 15 March 1990 was a "large-scale feint." The roofs of the buildings, which were considered "damaged by fire" because of first satellite photos, were covered with stripes of black paint. However, the painting was incomplete and had been forgotten on the side walls of parts of the roofs. Within the wall that surrounds the combat agent facility in al-Rabitah a substance was burned that produced large amounts of smoke—perhaps piles of tires, waste oil, or similar substances. The quality of the first satellite pictures was considerably reduced because of rain and clouds. That is why at first large-scale damage by fire in al-Rabitah was reported. Later pictures were better and uncovered the deception.

USSR Halts Troop Withdrawal From GDR

*LD1605093690 Hamburg DPA in German 0911 GMT
16 May 90*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Soviet Union has stopped the unilateral troop withdrawal from the GDR that was announced two years ago. This has been confirmed by informed circles in the Federal Defense Ministry in Bonn today. A Defense Ministry spokesman said there were no concrete indications that the halt "is politically motivated." Rather there were signs that the Soviet Union could not absorb its returning soldiers so quickly. There was a shortage of homes and jobs.

Deutschlandfunk reported today that, in particular, the withdrawal of two tank divisions from the GDR has been suspended. According to the radio station's information, informed circles in Washington are saying that the Soviet general staff had pushed through vis-a-vis President Mikhail Gorbachev "a general review of disarmament positions with a view to the Vienna negotiations." The decision to stop the withdrawal should be seen against that background.

In Bonn it was pointed out that the Soviet Union had committed itself by treaty vis-a-vis Hungary and Czechoslovakia to withdraw troops. Even with those withdrawals, the Soviets had had problems. Returning soldiers and their families had had to be accommodated in tents.

According to DPA information, Moscow had intended to unilaterally withdraw 36,000 of its 400,000 soldiers stationed in the GDR. So far, however, only 11,000 Soviet troops have been brought home. According to experts, the Soviets had also intended to withdraw 4,000 of the around 7,000 combat tanks in the GDR. So far

only around 2,000 have been transported back to the USSR. As to combat aircraft, the Soviet Army's plans were for the withdrawal of 140. However, only around 100 have been withdrawn so far.

Stoltenberg Views Goals of NATO Meeting

AU2205143290 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 22 May 90 p 2

[“cas” report: “NATO Plans New Strategy”]

[Excerpt] Brussels—NATO wants to draw strategic conclusions for its maneuvers on land and the exercises of its air forces in the partner countries from the changes in Eastern and Central Europe and from the considerably longer early warning times before a possible attack. Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg confirmed on Monday [21 May] that the goal of the meeting of NATO defense minister at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels is to considerably reduce the burden for the population—particularly concerning low-altitude flights. Stoltenberg also announced that a basic discussion of the plan to increasingly establish multinational units will be held at the meeting that opened on Monday with a discussion among the European defense ministers and which will continue on Tuesday [22 May] and Wednesday [23 May] with the participation of all alliance ministers. However, he made it clear once more that as an alliance NATO is not negotiable, but that it should only be “enriched” with elements of all-European cooperation.

With a view to the nuclear component of NATO's future strategy, the defense minister stressed that there is agreement among the alliance that talks on the short-range nuclear systems can be opened at the beginning of next year on condition that a first agreement on conventional disarmament is reached in Vienna this fall. Irrespective of the interpretation of the formulations contained in the communique of the “Nuclear Planning Group,” which convened two weeks ago, he still considers the renunciation of the artillery systems possible, when the Soviet Armed Forces will be withdrawn from the East European countries by the middle of 1991 “at the latest.” At this point, this Western category of weapons will become superfluous. [passage omitted]

FRANCE

Thomson-CSF, BA Cooperate on Tactical Missiles

90AN0249A Paris LA LETTRE HEBDOMADAIRE DU GIFAS in English No 1506-1 8 Mar 90 p 2

[Text] Following the approval of the French Government, Thomson-CSF and British Aerospace will now form a joint venture for weapon systems built around

tactical missiles, thereby merging their respective activities in this field. To begin with, a non-trading management company will be formed under the name “Eurodynamics”. It will prepare the founding of the joint venture which will have an annual turnover of around 14 billion francs. Eurodynamics will thus be the first European firm handling weapon systems based on ground, naval and air tactical missiles. Negotiations on the project started two years ago when the two firms noted their common long-term interests and budgetary advantages, simultaneous with growth in the international market. It will be a fully integrated European firm sufficiently endowed to compete on the international scene. The firm should be capable of investing in research and development for future weapons and to assemble the necessary resources for developing the advanced weapon system projects of tomorrow.

Arms Agreements Will Engender More Sophisticated Systems

90ES0781C Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 8 Mar 90 pp 80-81

[Article by Jean-Pierre Casamayou: “The Technological Stakes of Disarmament”]

[Text] Arms reduction agreements are going to stimulate the development of new technologies. Especially in the fields of ultra-precise surveillance systems and equipment to protect the weaponry remaining...

Europe is going to have to change its defense technologies. This was one of the conclusions reached by the 13 defense ministers of the Independent European Program Group during their recent meeting in Scotland.

From monitoring of compliance with disarmament accords to development of new arms systems and even treaty violations, it is certain that one of the first consequences of the arms reduction agreements will be a rush to new technology.

First, there is the matter of assuring the reality of disarmament, that is verifying whether the signatories to the treaties are fulfilling their treaty obligations to the letter. To do so, the nations concerned are going to augment their existing surveillance systems (optical satellites, radars, airplanes and reconnaissance drones) and design a wide range of new sensing devices. The Open Skies accord will create an opportunity to accelerate the development of such systems. This treaty, which should be ratified in May, envisions overflights of the territory of signatory states by airplanes equipped with a battery of electromagnetic sensors (such as synthetic aperture radars) and optronics. The basic technologies are already well understood: infrared line-scanning and simple electro-optic cameras. The Americans have calculated that such equipment would cost about Fr100 million per aircraft.

But that will not be enough: Instruments even more sophisticated must be created. For example, the hypersonic Aurora aircraft, studied by the American army as a possible replacement for its SR-71 Blackbird. France, which is not as advanced in this field, is betting on the Helios optical reconnaissance satellites. Thanks to the Spot program, the technologies are fully mature: the new high resolution video cameras and high-performance magnetic recorders will make it possible to get photos with 1-meter resolution (about 10 meters with the Spot). The next step will be development of a radar satellite capable of overcoming the adverse weather conditions (clouds) which often frustrate optical surveillance over much of Europe. The radars will employ lateral scanning or synthetic aperture technology. The European ERS-1 satellite, dedicated to oceanographic research, will provide the first test of this new technology: nevertheless, its limited precision (several dozen meters) makes it unsuitable for military use.

In any case, these optical and radar reconnaissance systems will require very sophisticated image processing, an area in which MS2-I, a joint subsidiary of Matra and SEP, already has impressive credentials.

Increasingly Intelligent Weapons

Signatory nations will also have to monitor their borders and air space. For that, they are counting on a new generation of radars equipped with electronic scanning antennas. That explains the effort Thomson has put into development of integrated monolithic hyperfrequency circuit (MMIC) technology using gallium arsenide for the radars' active modules.

Also, following the example of the United States and Australia, France is doing research on over-the-horizon radar. This detection system (one prototype called "Nostradamus," designed by DRET [expansion unknown] and ONERA [National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research], is currently undergoing tests in the Dreux region) can detect movements beyond the range of traditional radars. Making use of meter-length waves, its radar beam is not aimed directly at the object: It is reflected from the upper strata of the atmosphere. Result: It illumines targets from overhead, over the whole surface of the plane or ship. But the perceived need to maintain surveillance over some 6,000 different sites, such as materiel depots and military bases, has given rise to the idea of employing automatic systems: Receivers and sensors that would keep track of optical, electromagnetic and seismic data. Systems would be linked together by high-capacity computers, like the ACCS (airborne command and control system) for radars.

All these systems are going to require new developments in electronics, signals processing and data handling, and faster computers with revolutionary new architecture. This is what is behind current research in the field of very high speed integrated circuits (VHSIC), the development of new semiconductors (gallium arsenide), the research on neuronal computers, and development of data processing tools capable of running programs containing on the order of a million instructions.

These "force multipliers" themselves will soon be insufficient. For the military brass are always trying to get the same firepower out of a smaller number of weapons. That will translate into increasingly sophisticated materials and new developments in unrestricted weapons categories ("Gorby-compatibles" is the new buzzword). Thus research on "intelligent" weaponry will be emphasized. Missiles, whether self-guided or using terminal guidance systems, will employ fiber optic, infrared (IRCCD) or millimeter-wave-length guidance technology. Even traditional tank guns could be transformed into electromagnetic artillery.

Another indirect result of disarmament: It will be necessary to economize and protect the remaining weaponry as well as the troops, whose training is quite costly. In consequence, everything that has to do with countermeasures and protection (optical countermeasures against infrared-guided missiles, electronic countermeasures against guided or semi-guided missiles) will get special attention.

When Soldiers Return to Civilian Life

Similarly, techniques to augment the "stealthiness" of weapons will also be given priority: New shapes that are poor reflectors of radar waves (warships or tanks), composite materials that absorb particular wave-lengths on the surfaces of airplanes and submarines. Also, in order to save on equipment and avoid losses during exercises, combat simulations will be employed much more widely; and they will be more realistic, using new visualization techniques such as Sogitec's GI 10000 or Thomson's Visa 4.

All the same, these research and development activities will have to survive in a budget-restricted environment. So it will be difficult to devote large sums to strictly military research and development, a fact which so far is having the effect of channeling efforts toward civilian research.

There is thus some risk that the present basis of military technology will undergo drastic change and become increasingly tied in with civilian technology, to the point that civilian and military research are distinguishable only by their applications. Thus part of what is at stake with disarmament is the ability to maintain a technological base as broad as possible, to satisfy both civilian and military needs.

Paris Paper Views Bush's Missile Decision

PM0905091090 Paris LE MONDE in French
5 May 90 p 1

[Editorial: "The Abandonment of the Lance Missiles"]

[Text] Mr Bush's decision to abandon production of the short-range Lance missiles which were, in principle, to enter service in 1992, replacing the similar missiles deployed in Europe during the 1970's, is a practical gesture which shows his intention of responding to the changes which have taken place on the Old Continent in recent months and "rewarding" Mr Gorbachev for them. However, it is doubtful that the latter will see it as a "victory" likely to make people forget the innumerable problems which are assailing him on all other fronts.

This gesture is the least that could be expected. This is partly because of the scale of the political and also military upheavals which have taken place in the region and also, more especially, because it corresponds less to a Soviet demand than to a demand from public opinion in the main countries concerned, primarily Germany.

Back in the early 1980's, the West Germans had great difficulty in accepting the Pershing and cruise missiles deployed to counter the hundreds of Soviet medium-range missiles which Brezhnev had added to his arsenal. The 1987 agreement on the Euromissiles had ended the quarrel, but the presence of almost 4,000 nuclear warheads on short-range missiles (less than 500 km) which were left out of the treaty, had become even more intolerable, despite the superiority which the USSR still has in this kind of weapon. Were the Lance missiles not intended only for the East Germans, Czechoslovaks, or Hungarians—European "cousins" who had become brothers since the abandonment of the communist regimes?

The postponement of modernization, decided last year after one of the last major quarrels in the Atlantic alliance, could already be interpreted as the first step toward abandonment. Today's decision confirms this development which, without ending the nuclear deterrence doctrine advocated by the main allies, limits its sphere of application: Nuclear weapons are more or less tolerated by public opinion if they are on ships or, if necessary, on planes, but they are no longer tolerated if they are ground-based weapons which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as more dangerous and as potential targets.

Only France is going against this trend by persisting in its program to build the Hades surface missile—the equivalent of the U.S. Lance missile which has now been sacrificed. At the last Franco-German summit, Chancellor Kohl was prepared not to see it as a problem, but the question will be raised again sooner or later.

This is particularly true because the argument put forward by Paris—the need for a "final warning" weapon—does not explain how this objective could be achieved with a weapon which can only be targeted on friendly countries. Resorting to naval and airborne weapons is likely to be the only conceivable solution for France one day as it is for the United States now.

NETHERLANDS

Nerve Gas Technology to Iran Prevented
90EN0542B Amsterdam VRIJ NEDERLAND
in Dutch 17 Mar 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Ko Colijn and Paul Rusman: "The Netherlands Almost Delivered a Nerve Gas Factory to Iran: Foreign Affairs Sent Its Envoys Around the World to Warn People, But Economic Affairs Still Liked the Idea of a Million-Dollar Order"]

[Text] Dutch "interests" tried to deliver a pesticide factory to Iran, according to a secret American document

(in the possession of the United Nations). This factory could have been used to produce a simple nerve gas for the Iranian armed forces.

Initially, the Ministry of Economic Affairs found the order for Zoetermeer company John Brown Engineering (\$37 million) attractive. It was only after a year and a half, in March 1989, that the ministry changed its tack in favor of the arguments put forth by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The pesticide in question could be used to make poisonous gas.

Thus, a success for Minister van den Broek, but according to some not without its price: The Hague allegedly insisted on a "quiet pull-out" from the project. There was also a request for solidarity from other potential suppliers, who are united in the so-called Australian Group. This includes representatives of 20 countries who twice a year consult confidentially on measures to counter the spread of chemical weapons.

"It is important that other Australian Group members not undermine The Hague if the Dutch do not go through with the sale," says the warning in the American document. But is it in fact possible to keep Iran from going ahead with its chemical plans? West German investigators continue to suspect several companies, including a Dutch one, of chemical deliveries to that country.

A story about two years of quiet diplomacy and the dissuasion mechanism.

Between 1985 and mid-1988, Iran fired a total of 455 ballistic missiles at its Iraqi enemy. As far as is known, none had chemical charges, only "ordinary" explosive warheads.

It was only a matter of time, because in late 1987 Iranian Prime Minister Musavi triumphantly announced the arrival of "sophisticated offensive chemical weapons" produced domestically.

But at that point the war could no longer be won with them. That is perhaps one of the reasons that Teheran—but also Baghdad—has plunged into a massive rearmament program during the current pause in the conflict. This program includes serial production of a missile that can be fired 40 kilometers, the Oghab, and one with a range of 130 kilometers, the Iran-130.

Unfortunately, little imagination is necessary in order to see the next round of the Gulf War as a war of annihilation if there exists the possibility of producing chemical warheads for these missiles on a large scale.

The process of how a country gets its hands on a poison gas factory can be pieced together as follows: First, harmless screws and nuts are acquired, then a couple of Western engineers are hired to build a so-called insecticide or pharmaceuticals factory, and some time later there is, to everyone's—feigned?—horror, a chemical weapons complex.

Yesterday, it was Samarra in Iraq, today it is Rabta in Libya. And tomorrow it might be Gashwin in Iran.

In the fall of 1987, John Brown Engineering in Zoetermeer was approached by the Iranian company Narim concerning the construction of a complete phosphorus pentasulfide factory, valued at around 75 million guilders.

Narim said that it was negotiating on behalf of Melli Agricultural Chemicals, a vague sponsor of the project. The only association that Melli evoked was with the Iranian bank that financially transacted the numerous arms shipments from the West.

Narim had first approached the American company Stauffer, but that firm was afraid of problems with the U.S. government and politely referred the Iranians to overseas licensees, including John Brown in the Netherlands.

According to information from the Iranians, the product phosphorus pentasulfide was to be used as a basic material in a pesticide factory.

Like the P_2S_5 factory in Gashwin, Iran, this pesticide factory was to be built by a German consortium led by Lurgi, a contracting firm. Thus, together the factories would be capable of producing nerve gas.

John Brown was cautious in accepting this order. The company first went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss several problems. It may be assumed that John Brown, which would make use of Stauffer patents in building the factory, first wanted to find out the U.S. reaction to the Gashwin operation, even though it did not involve any direct American deliveries.

There are indeed strict Dutch rules concerning chemical deliveries, but they do not go so far as to prohibit the transaction.

Still, Foreign Affairs smelled a rat and wanted John Brown—for lack of legal regulations—to pull out of the deal voluntarily, in accordance with a practice that is currently known in the world of chemicals as the dissuasion mechanism. A form of persuasion exerted on companies by governments—although according to some it involves heavy pressure—to pull out of suspect business transactions, without there being a legal instrument to enforce that wish.

Messengers

Messengers from van den Broek were sent out all over the world. But close to home, in The Hague, the Ministry of Economic Affairs did not care much for the dissuasion mechanism: First, it had to be shown that there was a direct technical relationship between P_2S_5 (phosphorus pentasulfide) and poison gas. The Ministry of Economic Affairs, the natural defender of the interests of Dutch industry, did not feel that it was the right party to block nice orders such as this one for vague political reasons.

They were anxious to avoid establishing precedents that would further increase the influence of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs over trade policy. The FRG too was warned, due to the involvement of Lurgi and Bayer.

The reaction in Bonn—all this was going on in 1987, about a year before the disclosure of West German involvement in the Libyan Rabta complex—was also lukewarm. Even warnings from its own ambassador in Baghdad to the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs were wearily disregarded. There were no concrete indications of Iranian plans to produce poison gas, and one could not simply reject any pesticide factory, could one? Even the American (counter)argument noted that P_2S_5 was not even on the international list of prohibited substances. Nor was it on the warning list, which was kept within the Australian Group as a guideline for deliveries of poison gas components that were not prohibited, but that should be dissuaded.

In the meantime, there was also little that John Brown could do, because Iran was covering its bases and feeling out alternative suppliers, such as the Swiss factory Krebs.

But John Brown had the best chance of pulling in the order.

In mid-1988, the tide turned in the United States. Suddenly, scientific researchers discovered that technically it was quite possible to directly produce the very poisonous gas amithon from phosphorus pentasulfide without too much trouble. In political terms, the prospect of the Iranian nerve gas capacity drew the attention of not only of officials inside the U.S. government involved in trade, but also those concerned with arms proliferation.

The wheels of the U.S. bureaucracy turn somewhat more slowly than they do here.

The end of the year saw the eruption of the scandal surrounding Rabta, the Libyan poison gas factory, which was very embarrassing to the West German government. In Bonn, everyone suddenly became cautious. The chances that the deal would go through were less certain, even if P_2S_5 was not on any "suspect" list. This was also the reason that the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs did not immediately change its tack.

A trade mission led by State Secretary Y. van Rooy (CDA) was lectured on 7 March 1989 in Washington about the dangers of chemical weapons and their proliferation in the Middle East through the "sneaky" acquisition policy of the governments in question. It is scarcely coincidental that on 10 March THE NEW YORK TIMES warned the world that phosphorus pentasulfide has now been recognized as a precursor to the poison gases parathion, malathion, and amithon ("as poisonous as tabun") and revealed that the Swiss company Krebs (a conscious leak by the State Department?) was in the market for the tainted order.

The Dutch role in the order remained a secret, but the warning shot had been fired.

After van Rooy returned, there was a personal meeting between her and Minister van den Broek on 16 March of last year, after which she agreed to discourage the order. Minister de Korte followed, and Economic Affairs was won over.

Business development manager S. Williams of John Brown confirms his company's pull-out, but refuses to respond to questions concerning the reasons that his company in fact turned down the potential order. John Brown decided "for various business reasons" not to do it, he says, and that "includes policy reasons."

He could not provide details, since "this is a very sensitive case." Asked whether that decision was made directly in March, he responds, "No, later on that year." According to the British newspaper THE OBSERVER, although unfamiliar with the name John Brown, the Dutch government demanded secrecy concerning this decision and was informed by diplomatic circles that the dissuasion mechanism worked only if the chemicals companies received a guarantee that their actions would not cause them any embarrassment.

This clarification cannot be confirmed in the Netherlands. Manager Williams of John Brown says that his company had "no assurance" that the competition would also refuse the order. But in the meantime, this is, coincidentally, exactly what happened: The Swiss competitor Krebs, in part because of active lobbying by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and under American pressure, turned down the Iranian deal in May.

In order to stay one step ahead of Iran, van den Broek's envoys also approached Italy, Great Britain, and the FRG separately, accompanied by American pressure.

In the United States, in the meantime, the process of fragmentation in that country's policy on proliferation was finally halted. In order to more effectively tackle questions concerning the spread of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, questions that were becoming increasingly dangerous, the entire issue at the Department of State was placed under the guidance of Under Secretary Reginald Bartholomew (who is, incidentally, a well-known figure in Dutch diplomatic circles: He was the architect of the legendary NATO "double option").

Political pressure on the members of the Australian Group not to leave the Netherlands out in the cold was stepped up. In the confidential document "'Pesticide' Plant in Iran, U.S. Views," the members were warned, "However, it is important that other Australian Group members not undermine The Hague if the Dutch do not go through with the sale."

The countries were reminded that the "sale of chemicals, including those not subject to controls by the Australian Group," must be considered carefully in light of:

- "the recent proliferation and use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the Middle East, especially in Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Syria;
- "the support given by those countries to international terrorism;
- "the probability that they will use these weapons, in defiance of the Convention of 1925 (as Iraq has already done);

- "world reaction if this factory does in fact end up being used to produce nerve gas, and the humanitarian considerations and security risks associated with the spread of chemical weapons;
- "(the fact that), despite the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, both states are undoubtedly trying to step up their nerve gas capacity. Such a factory would significantly increase the ability of unstable states to produce nerve gas."

A request was made to the members of the Australian Group "that phosphorus pentasulfide be added to the Australian Group warning list this May," which is exactly what happened.

The danger appeared to be averted, and the U.S.-Dutch campaign was a success. Or perhaps simply "the Dutch" campaign, given the lukewarm U.S. position until halfway through 1988. But even at the highest levels, there is a tendency to steal one another's fire: The British Foreign Office claims that the Dutch blew the whistle after they were informed of the Iranian order by John Brown's British parent company.

But it is still too early for celebration. It is still possible that Gashwin will become a second Rabta. On 14 November of last year, German investigators in Leverkusen, Dormagen, and Monheim raided the offices of chemicals giant Bayer. Right now, prosecutors are looking into whether Bayer and Lurgi are guilty of providing material for the pesticide factory.

Last December, foreign sources in the Australian Group noted the involvement of "a Dutch" supplier, and mentioned the name—for extra salt in SED wounds—of the GDR state-owned enterprise VEB Chemie.

The Iranian need for phosphorus pentasulfide remains enormous, and despite the warning list (which offers nothing more than a dubious guarantee of an embargo), there are only two countries in the world that can ban exports of the stuff: Japan and Ireland.

Thus, it appears that Pandora's box cannot be shut.

Chemical Weapons Technology Supplied to Libya

90EN0542A Amsterdam VRIJ NEDERLAND in Dutch
24 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[Article by Ko Colijn and Paul Rusman: "Dutch Company Involved in Poison Gas Factory in Libya: Kwint Techniek Bore the 'Rabta' Risk"]

[Text] The company Kwint Techniek, headquartered in Culemborg, was involved in supplying control equipment for Colonel al-Qadhafi's nerve gas factory in Rabta. This has been revealed by a German investigation that last Monday culminated in raids by German investigators at nine separate locations. Kwint was willing to accept the risk that the West Germans did not want to take on: to provide a computer with which the production of Libyan combat gas could be automated. The

delivery, which was settled in writing, was thwarted right before the first transport, last Tuesday.

The companies had set up a supply line to Libya that was so ingeniously designed that it was supposed to be practically "invisible." After the Rabta affair broke out around the end of 1988, German prosecutors had mercilessly assailed companies such as Imhausen-Chemie and Siemens AG for their role in the factory at Rabta. Further West German deliveries seemed next to impossible.

The fact that the FRG was involved in the affair had been extremely embarrassing for Chancellor Kohl, who had brushed aside secret U.S. warnings. Afterwards, the German government was interested in only one thing: effacing the scandal. It will probably never be completely clear whether the Germans actually had anything to do with the fire in Rabta last week, or with setting it. But the German foreign office will hardly be unhappy about that.

The interruption in deliveries prompted a number of German companies to look for covert paths, since al-Qadhdhafi had placed a high premium on breaking the boycott. Al-Qadhdhafi hired Thai workers to complete construction on the poison factory, and while U.S. Keyhole satellites kept an eye on the Libyan desert, the opening of Rabta was awaited.

The factory was still lacking vital equipment, including control computers that were to be used to automate the production of the "medicine" (as the nerve gas was called). In order to make it possible to ship the computers in such a roundabout way, they turned to Kwint, who was responsible for the final delivery to Libya. The setup was like this: The West German company Abacus, in Ulm, bought the processing computer in question, the Telepern-M system, from Siemens. That seemed to be a respectable destination. But Abacus was not planning to use the computer. Abacus in turn found the Dutch company Kwint Techniek willing to buy the Telepern and to ship it out to Rabta. The destination from Culemborg, on paper, was a Panamanian buyer named Hipari. This was in turn a front for the Swiss company Decotec, a majority of which was in the hands of Arab capital. Decotec is (thus) suspected of having set up the supply arrangement. Kwint Techniek would receive a commission fee for all this, which in fact boils down to earnings on its risk.

According to German sources, Kwint, in order to protect the German companies from any suspicion, released a written statement to the effect that the control equipment was intended for a water purification installation in Saudi Arabia. That was necessary, since these control computers have been blacklisted for Libya since the Rabta affair last year. This had the effect of hoodwinking the German authorities. According to German standards, Kwint was thus involved in violation of the Foreign Trade Act, while according to Dutch standards there is still some question as to whether Kwint can be charged with anything. The Dutch export list is not as strict as the West German one has been since Rabta. But to sum up: Siemens supplied a vital computer to Kwint, and Kwint bore the "Rabta" risk.

The role of Siemens, which was seriously beleaguered by the West German intelligence service after last year's Rabta affair, is not clear. It is possible that the company now wants clean hands at any price and neatly passes along any foreign transaction. It is also possible that the company looked for a covert path, but that the action got too hot and it saved itself from the deliveries through a leak to the intelligence service. The fact that German investigators did not harass Siemens on Monday could lead one to conclude that the first statement is applicable, and that the conspiracy should be sought more in the connection between Abacus and Decotec.

The raid on Kwint and the West German companies took place at the classic moment, on the evening before the expensive computer was to be sent to the Netherlands. West German prosecutors, who are tight-lipped anyway, will say only that at the same moment that the German investigators were raiding companies in the FRG, their Dutch colleagues were knocking on the door at Kwint.

Director J.C.G. Kwint confirms that there was "a little talk" with the Economic Control Service, but calls reports about involvement with Rabta "all nonsense." His company does supply isotopes to Libya for medical purposes, but he is not involved in sensitive shipments. "Just ask [the Ministry of] Economic Affairs, they know all about it there, you have to have a permit for even the tiniest things." Kwint specializes in nuclear medicine, process chemistry, the separation of gases, and it has some experience with German colleagues in the area of sensitive deliveries: A couple of years ago, the company supplied equipment for West German nuclear power plants in Argentina.

The question of to what extent Kwint can also be identified as "the Dutch company" that helped with the installation of the Iranian nerve gas factory in Gashwin (see last week's *VRIJ NEDERLAND*) by way of Bayer, the West German chemicals giant, remains to be investigated, but at the moment no light can be shed on this from West German circles.

Because of the hasty intervention by German prosecutors, Kwint could escape serious consequences, since no actual export shipment had yet taken place.

UNITED KINGDOM

Defense Secretary on Talks in USSR

*LD1805113590 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1058 GMT 18 May 90*

[By Charles Miller PRESS ASSOCIATION defense correspondent, in Moscow]

[Text] Defence Secretary Tom King flew home from Moscow today proclaiming a new era in Anglo-Soviet relations. After an intensive five-day visit, he said that despite some tough talking the warmth of his reception was a "good omen" for relations between Britain and the Soviet Union.

The importance the Soviet attached to his visit was marked by a final round of Kremlin talks with Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

A detailed list of high level exchanges was also published, which Mr King said illustrated the broadening and deepening of defence links—including a visit by the Soviet destroyer Bezuprechnyy to Portsmouth in July. In October 1991, a battle group of British warships will visit the closed city of Sebastopol in the Crimea on the Black Sea, which not even Soviet tourists are allowed to see. Senior officers of the British Army of the Rhine and Soviet chiefs from the Western Group of Forces Germany will also meet.

But Mr King found the Soviets entrenched in their opposition to a united Germany becoming part of NATO. "I made the case very strongly that it is in their interests and the stability and security of Europe that a united Germany should be in NATO," he said. "I would not claim they had full agreement on that point. Certainly they maintained their concerns and their opposition to it."

There was also continued anxiety about NATO's modernisation of nuclear weapons, particularly air-launched systems. Mr King said he stressed NATO's belief in minimum deterrence, arguing that nuclear weapons were vital for European peace and security. "In this last week we have celebrated the longest period of peace in Europe ever, and I stress that a major factor has been nuclear weapons—the greatest life saver for the people of Europe," he said.

Mr King will report on his meetings with the Soviet chiefs of staff and Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov when NATO's Defence Planning Committee meets next week in Brussels. It will be quickly followed by a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Scotland and a summit of heads of government in London in July when the outline of the future map of Europe and new defence strategies will be drawn up.

A lot of tough talking remains because of Soviet concerns over German unification and the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, which are delaying the conventional disarmament talks in Vienna. But Mr King remained optimistic that the conventional arms agreement could be signed this year. And he was highly enthusiastic about future Anglo-Soviet relations.

Lithuanian Prime Minister Mrs Kazimiera Prunskiene briefly met Mr King when she called at the British Embassy in Moscow for talks with Ambassador Rodric Braithwaite.

King Warns Against Abandoning NATO

*LD2205135390 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1326 GMT 22 May 90*

[By Geoff Meade, PRESS ASSOCIATION, in Brussels]

[Text] Defence ministers today began a nuts and bolts review of NATO's future role in light of the collapse of

communism in Eastern Europe. The most far-reaching reforms in NATO's history follows Western military chiefs' claim that there was no longer a threat of attack from the combined forces of the Warsaw Pact.

But British Defence Secretary Tom King warned that fundamental defence principles must not be thrown away. He told the talks in Brussels that the Allies should not begin again with a blank sheet of paper. The review must re-establish a strong NATO on the basis of fundamental principles, including an effective mix of conventional and nuclear weapons and a strong presence of front line troops in Germany.

The review now under way was likely to last many months, as NATO's political and military strategists assess the reduced threat from Eastern Europe and tailor a new NATO for the 1990s and the next century.

Today defence ministers had before them an assessment from their military chiefs, setting out the reduced threat and future NATO requirements.

Yesterday the defence ministers acknowledged that the changes in Eastern Europe meant a "significantly reduced" threat from the Warsaw Pact.

But today NATO's military head, General Vigleik Eide went further. "Our clear assessment is that the threat from a united Warsaw Pact no longer exists," he declared at headquarters in Brussels.

But he emphasised that levels of Soviet forces were still "very impressive" and were constantly being modernised. He highlighted Soviet naval programmes, which were not slowing down. Soviet military hardware still significantly outnumbered NATO's. The top priority was now the completion of conventional arms reduction talks. He said military chiefs nevertheless were recommending a total review of strategy "and not just a facelift."

Mr King set out Britain's belief that the re-structuring of the alliance should be a three stage process; a complete review of policy, a confirmation that fundamental defence principles be retained, and setting out the technical needs to match the mood of the new Europe.

NATO's political bosses have time on their side, however, with no perceived urgency in altering strategy.

Defense Secretary Warns of Arms Treaty Delay

*LD2205220890 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1831 GMT 22 May 90*

[By Geoff Meade, PRESS ASSOCIATION in Brussels]

[Text] Defence Secretary Tom King warned tonight of the risk that conventional arms reduction talks between Washington and Moscow would not be wrapped up this year. The NATO allies believe the Soviets are dragging their feet over East Germany's position in a reunified German state. Moscow is concerned how East Germany

should be treated in any agreement on reduced force levels. The key issue is whether the East German element should be added to NATO's conventional force figures in light of impending reunification.

Mr King's concerns about the delay will be reflected in a declaration by NATO defence ministers tomorrow at the end of two days of talks in Brussels. NATO's future military strategy depends partly on the successful outcome of the talks and the signing of a new treaty reducing conventional forces by the East and West. A sweeping review of NATO policy has been triggered at the Brussels meeting of defence ministers and will be endorsed by NATO leaders in London in July. But, Mr King, in a press conference after the first day, spoke

pessimistically about the short-term prospects for an arms reduction agreements.

"It is all becoming a very muddled situation," he said.

The NATO allies have already expressed concern about foot-dragging by the Soviets in the talks, and will urge a speedy conclusion of the negotiations in tomorrow's communique from NATO headquarters in Brussels. Mr King said: "We are not happy about the situation. We want to get on with it and see some early resolution." With all the new pressures, Mr King made it clear that a deal this year was in serious doubt.

The NATO allies have meanwhile agreed to drop an existing annual commitment to increase national defence spending by three percent in real terms.

22161
40

NTIS
ATTN: PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government policy, view, or attitude of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.